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Abstract
This thesis hypothesizes ways in which contemporary theory constructs 
sensual  qualities  in  digital  objects.  I  disrupt  the  common  epistemological 
understandings  of  objects  to  describe  what  constitutes  a  sensual  alterity.  The 
sensible object is defined to be something more than representing a real object. 
This thesis expands upon demonstration files available in breve, an open-source, 
multi-agent  simulation  software.  The  digital  object  substructure  is  unpacked 
through the  lenses  of  theorists  Karan Barad and Graham Harman.  I  negotiate 
digital  bodies  as  vertices  and attributes  to  be ontologically  stable.  I  formulate 
rasterization (transferring vector to pixel visualization) to be a model of the intra-
actions  (assemblage  of  causal  forces)  of  agential  separability  (practice  of 
mattering)  showcasing  the  apparatus  as  inexhaustible  in  its  penetrative  cut.  I 
explore this sensual exteriority and apply the apparatus of touch to indicate the 
capacity of digital objects to experience otherness, or sensual alterity.
Keywords:  object,  digital,  simulation,  sensual,  apparatus,  boundary,  touch, 
alterity, rasterization, exteriority. 
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This thesis hypothesizes ways in which contemporary theory constructs 
sensual  qualities  in  digital  objects.  I  disrupt  the  common  epistemological 
understandings of objects to conceive of new ways to consider the digital object 
and its individuation from the environment. The theoretical goal is to devise a 
theory that allows for ontological and epistemological structures of objects to be 
modeled  into  simulation  as  sensual  phenomena.  The  purpose  of  this  thesis 
research is to investigate what constitutes a sensual alterity, and to reorganize the 
notion of objecthood otherness. I conclude with a theory of sensual alterity that 
excites an ethical responsibility in the relation of digital objects.
This work is inspired by previous research in artificial morality where I 
studied  moral  machines  and  the  capacity  for  ethics  to  be  computational.  By 
looking towards what would be sufficient to attribute moral standing to artificial 
agents,  a  new  term  was  introduced  to  me:  alterity.  Defined  through  human–
computer  interaction,  alterity  describes  the  relation  between  a  human  and  an 
artifact. But what of the experience of otherness for digital objects? I wanted to 
explore  digital  objects  capacity  to  experience  alterity.  This  could  be  achieved 
through artificial intelligence studies but felt this was a scope outside my reach in 
this time. Instead, I explore the term by way of the metaphor of the body, birthing 
the notion that digital objects may experience sensuality. In attempts to define a 
virtual and sensual alterity, I look to objects on screens and the ways in which 
these objects were generated and how they relate to each other. Further, I assert 
that  digital  objects  are  composite,  and  like  physical  objects,  that  they  have 
autonomous qualities, and as such, are said to be real and sensual.
In object biographies, we constitute what an object is by their relationships 
or alliances with others—namely, with other human actors. For this thesis, I look 
at digital objects and their relationships to a simulated environment. The property 
configurations  of  these  digital  objects  are  dynamic  and  exemplify  their 
autonomous  qualities.  By  assembling  sensual  alterity  in  terms  of  human–
computer interaction and object-oriented feminism, I question how sensual alterity 
is present in object-to-object relations. 
This thesis hypothesizes ways in which contemporary theory constructs 
sensual qualities in digital objects. It asks what epistemological frameworks have 
lead  to  the  chaste  and  rational  conception  of  objects  and  then  transfers  those 
theories to the virtual realm. The manner in which physical objects are discussed 
is paramount in the modeling of virtual objects; these objects are constructed by 
and  constructed  of  definition.  The  construction  of  these  objects  relies  on  the 
ontological conception of objects as a whole, meaning the manner in which these 
objects  were  constructed  were  constrained  by  their  makers  epistemological 
historicity. The use of simulation in this thesis is interesting as it appeals to an 
interdisciplinary  approach,  and  not  one  rooted  in  computer  science  and 
engineering.  I  cannot  write  code.  Yet,  I  use  simulation  as  an  opportunity  to 
explore contemporary theories of materialism, and consider in what ways these 
theories  map  upon  and  draw  attention  to  areas  of  overlap  and  conflict  in 
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contrasting materialism and virtuality.  The thesis  uses  breve  as  the  simulation 
software in which to reference and situate the discussed digital objects. The digital 
object substructure is unpacked as its graphical and modeled representations are 
considered through the lens of feminist science study theorist, Karan Barad  and 1
speculative  realist,  Graham Harman .  Sensual  boundaries  are  initiated  through 2
discussions of the apparatus of rasterization and intra-actions, a materialization 
process that, I argue, ought to be emulated in the natural laws hosted within the 
simulation environment. In this work, sensual objects are defined to be something 
more than representing a real object. Sensuality is not a representation, nor a sign, 
rather  a  phenomenal  doing.  The  ways  in  which  these  contemporary  physical 
theories  are  mapped  upon  digital  construction  and  visualization  in  the  breve 
simulation environment are key to the thesis’ capacity to indicate potentials for 
sensuality in digital objects.
The  purpose  of  this  research,  then,  is  to  disrupt  the  common 
epistemological understandings of digital objects and to conceive of new ways to 
consider the digital object and its differentiation from its environment. I reflect 
upon  representationalism  in  object  ontologies  and  consider  ways  that  this 
incarcerates the digital object.
The theoretical goal is to devise a theory that allows for the ontological 
and  epistemological  structures  of  objects  to  be  modeled  into  simulation 
 University of California. Feminist Studies Department. 1
 The American University in Cairo. Philosophy Department. 2
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environments to allow the phenomenal expression of the objects as sensual. I will 
be establishing a fiction in the concept of this so-called sensual digital objects. As 
such, this work queries and critiques theories of digital materialism. The thesis 
suggests  ethical  conclusions  that  indicate  a  lack  of  responsibility  in  the 
consideration of digital objects. A more responsible approach would understand 
digital objects as participating in, observing, and performing sensual acts while 
entangled with sensual boundaries. 
The available evidence of academic resources shows limited interest by 
contemporary  theorists  in  understanding  how  objects  exist  in  digital 
environments.  The  current  literature  on  computer  programming  abounds  with 
examples of the use of metaphor in the development of computer programming—
the predominant metaphor being architecture which problematically lead to the 
reestablishment of space being conceived as extensive.  Special effects in cinema
—including the use of particle systems in animation for crowd behaviour—puts 
forward the view that virtual reality is designed to facilitate human consciousness 
and industry. Research on the reusability and transferability between platforms 
and  programs  for  3D  graphics  indicates  the  cost-heavy  development  of  CGI. 
There is a corpus of literature on digital  networks that indicates an interest  in 
database aesthetes and info visualization. Bodies in code are prominent in the HCI 
literature on sensible technologies and embodiment.
The  literature  shows  no  consensus  on  the  ontological  status  of  digital 
objects. It appears as if the question is not addressed at all. This is problematic 
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given the considerable engagement and presence of digital objects. As such, this 
thesis  develops  a  claim that  digital  objects  are  necessarily  similar  to  physical 
objects given that the apparatus of individuation remains the same for all bodies, 
including for bodies in virtual space. These ideas and a further exploration into the 
history of object ontology will be picked up in my literature review section. This 
argument  contributes  to  the  theoretical  gap  in  digital  materialism  by  way  of 
maintaining and utilizing theoretical conceptualizations and terminology found in 
the literature of object-oriented philosophy to transfer agency and democracy to 
digital objects.  
My methodology is an applied critical theory and philosophical approach 
to  understanding  object  ontology  and  sensual  boundaries  in  simulation 
environments. I  use grounded theory method as a means to generate concepts. 
Key theoretical  contributions in the areas of  object-oriented feminism, applied 
ethics,  and  new  media  philosophies  inform  the  development  of  these  key 
definitions. I will be using post-structural and postmodern theories to refute the 
mainstream thinking of objects as they rely on the conception of matter and form 
from Descartes and Aristotle. I reject empiricism as it propounds the view that 
phenomenal experience requires a human observer. Empiricism is epistemological 
theory that privileges the claims of sense experiences or direct observation, rather 
than from the faculty of reason or understanding.  3
 "empiricism, n.,” OED Online. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61344?redirectedFrom=Empiricism+ (Accessed 3
February 18, 2016).
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This thesis  will  expand upon demonstration files available in breve,  an 
open-source, multi-agent simulation software. My method is to engage with the 
simulation software in a manner that contorts common scientific experimentation 
practices of objectivity and hypothesis to develop a fiction of simulation alteration 
that becomes fruitful for theory development. I use simulation to map theory of 
objectness down to its particular features and assumptions of objecthood with a 
focus on explanatory power, and not on forecasting.  
The limitations of this study include the lack of a thorough consideration 
of the user and maker. Instead, I explore simulation in considerations of the ways 
it is responsible for modeling both a target source and knowledge. The user is 
considered, and as a user author myself, inescapably the user is assumed in all 
epistemological instances of this argument. The user’s agency does not simply 
disappear, though it is not prioritized in this argument. Where the discussion of 
intentional  objects  necessarily  requires  an  observer,  I  attempt  to  prioritize  the 
response of the digital  object.  Where possible,  this  thesis  investigates ways in 
which the observer is the digital object as opposed to a human cognizer. I analyze 
non-human  based  intentionality  and  the  reality  of  digital  objects  through 
materialization studies and object-oriented ontologies. In this manner, the thesis 
takes  on  an  object-oriented  approach.  This  scope  doesn’t  exclude  the  user 
observer in an effort to navigate a mind-independent reality, nor does it attempt to 
operate in an externalist field of coherence; rather, the limitation is included to 
consider the potentiality of new digital object observers.
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In  the  first  section,  “Representation  and  Mediating  Structures  of  the 
Apparatus,”  I  question  how  the  apparatus  has  reconfigured  the  ontological 
understanding  of  objects.  I  look  to  representationalism  as  responsible  for 
dissonance in referent modeling, and at the effect of object-oriented ontology’s 
restrictive domains on objectivity when discussing object autonomy. In the second 
section, “Applied Assemblage,” I discuss how agential separability and empirical 
matter  are configured as  examined by Karen Barad,  considering as  well,  their 
theoretical reaches as they are transposed into a virtual realm. I then offer my 
critical lens for the ontology of digital objects, focusing on the tensions of real and 
sensual  objects  to  explore  how  contemporary  theory  has  produced  sensible 
qualities in digital objects. Introduced in the third section (“Biography of Breve”) 
is a popular multi-agent simulation program. A user-focused description of the 
simulation software is employed to analyze the syntheses between the graphical 
event  and the construction of digital objects; these exist, I argue in juxtaposition 
with the object ontologies of contemporary and traditional philosophies. I ask if 
the  ontological  requirements  of  physical  objects  can  be  exhibited  in  the 
architectural  forms  of  digital  objects.  The  fourth  section,  “Sensual  Facets,” 
designs  the  discursive  practice  of  rasterization  (transferring  vector  to  pixel 
visualization) to be a model of the intra-actions (assemblage of causal forces) of 
agential  separability  (practice  of  mattering)  showcasing  how  the  apparatus  is 
inexhaustible  in  its  penetrative  cut.  In  this  cut,  the  object  demonstrates  an 
unrivalled exteriority—the face of a digital object. In addition, “Sensual Alterity” 
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takes the sensual exteriority previously defined and applies the apparatus of touch 
to indicate the capacity of digital objects to experience otherness (namely, as the 




This  literature  review  aims  to  converge  historical  digital  object 
development  texts,  with  a  lineage  in  the  evolution  of  object  orientation  as  a 
product  of  the  decentered  subject  through  the  development  of  computer 
technology.  Granted,  the  scope  of  this  literature  review  cannot  access  in  its 
entirety the recent history of the computational machine, nor address its affect 
upon cultural  theories.  In  my research,  I  attempted  to  chart  the  digital  object 
model development from programming to ontology. These digital artifacts were 
modeled  with  human  as  both  muse  and  end  user.  From  the  foundations  of 
computer graphics, interactive objects were first investigated in terms of network 
and  its  subsequent  impact  on  information  and  power  distribution.  Human-
computer interaction was not a focus as I aimed to bracket empiricism, though 
paramount to the development of these objects is supposed cognitive modeling  in 
the  design  of  all  computer  programming.  Feminist  digital  and  material 
engagements are introduced as the reconfigured body includes the extension of 
prothesis  and  the  embodiment  of  information.  As  a  scholar,  this  thinking  is 
prevalent  in my modeling of  digital  bodies.  I  will  introduce through a unique 
narrative a call  to action that incorporates the subtle perspective of the object. 
Finally, I discuss object oriented ontologies as the foundational coming to know 
objects  in  their  autonomous  agency  purposed  in  this  thesis.  This  section  is 
inspired by the methodology of postmodern literary critic N. Katherine Hayles  in 4
 Duke University. Graduate Studies in Literature. 4
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How We Became Posthuman  (1999),  proclaiming: “I want to entangle abstract 
form [literary texts] and material particularity [scientific theories] such that the 
reader will find it increasingly difficult to maintain the perception that they are 
separate and discrete entities.”  5
The construction of digital objects is full of industry expressions that to a 
reader  unfamiliar  with  programming  languages  and  complicated  model  logic 
would  find  inaccessible.  In  part,  the  reason  computer  animation,  computer 
graphics and interactive design are accessory interest in the academic arena, are 
because of their pervasive commercial applications.  Almost all of the examples 6
of early object construction can be assimilated by papers exploring web-based 
models  and  repositories.  Paul  Fishwick ,  Director  of  Digital  Arts  &  Science 7
Programs at  the  University  of  Florida,  lists  circa  1991 assumptions  of  digital 
object models; they must be of “homogenous types,” “be static and not dynamic”, 
“conform to  pre-defined  standards,”  “shall  not  have  aesthetic  properties,”  and 
ought “adopt object-orient design principles.”  These assumptions are rooted in 8
the iconographic Teapot from Martin Newell (computer scientist) who “rendered a 
unique  set  of  Bezier  surface  spline  patches  from  an  ordinary  teapot,  which 
 Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics 5
(Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 23.
 Michael Tanzillo, Peter Weishar, Bridget Gaynor and Josephine Leong, Digital Art Curriculum Framework 6
(ACM SIGGRAPH, 2008)
 University of Florida. Computer and Information Science and Engineering. 7
 Paul Fishwick, On Web-Based Models and Repositories (Florida: University of Florida, 2010), 4.8
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currently  resides  in  the  Computer  Museum  in  Boston.”  Each  of  these 9
assumptions were challenges within 10 years. For example, it was indicated that 
dynamism was the difference between an object and a model, and that each new 
model “destroy[ed] achievements in standardization,”  or consider the aesthetic 10
usability  effect.  Further,  for  object-oriented  design  Fishwick  finds  deep 11
philosophical  concern  between  encapsulation  and  the  scalability  (relationally) 
inherent to modeling.  Fishwick observes that “in a broad sense, and as suggested 12
by the term ‘object-oriented,’ these modules may be viewed as individual objects, 
each with their own functions, interfaces, attributes, and allowable operations.”  13
In  the  manner  that  a  digital  object  is  a  “distinct  unit  of  existence  and/or 
abstraction;  having state,  behaviour,  and identity;  and which can be observed, 
manipulated  and/or  affected,”  the  digital  object  as  correspondence,  is  a 14
“metaphor expressed as a pairwise relation.”  In an attempt to go beyond, the 15
actual  modeling  of  this  relationally  was  proposed  by  introducing  a  new 
 Paul A. Fishwick and John F. Hopkins, “3D Behavioral Model Design for Simulation and Software 9
Engineering,” in On Web-based Models and Repositories, 35- 44 (Florida: University of Florida, 2010), 35.
 Fishwick, On Web-Based Models and Repositories, 5. 10
 Masaaki Kurosu and Kaori Kashimura, “Apparent Usability vs. Inherent Usability: Experimental Analysis on 11
the Determinants of the Apparent Usability,” in Conference Companion on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems (CHI ’95), ed. I. Katz, R. Mack, and L. Marks (ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1995), 292-293.
 Fishwick, On Web-Based Models and Repositories, 8.12
 Paul A. Fishwick and John F. Hopkins, “On the Use of 3D Metaphor in Programming,” in Enabling Technology 13
for Simulation Science IV, Ed. Alex F. Sisti. Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 4026 (2000), 54.
 R. M. Cubert and P. A. Fishwick, “Digital Object Multimodel Simulation Formalism and Architecture,” in 14
Enabling Technology for Simulation Science. Ed. Alex F. Sisti. Proceedings of SPIE Vol 4026 (2000), 121. 
 Cubert and Fishwick, Digital Object Multimodel Simulation, 121.  15
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‘perspective  [of  direction]:  as  a  spatial  object.”  Direction  was  modeled  as  a 16
vector (which is “both magnitude and direction but no fixed position in space”).  17
This  new perspective  “allows  [for]  the  definition  of  the  orientation  of  spatial 
objects;  it  gives  a  richer  set  of  predicates  and  operators  on  direction  and 
orientation.”  18
Much of the research has been focused on the manner in which digital 
objects interact. Namely, the production of behaviour-rich graphical environments 
examining collision detection. An overview of geometry for graphical events are 
prominent in the literature on digital objects, including the bounding box which 
will be discussed in some length in the section “Bounding Box and Response-
Ability” in the thesis. Evidence for the exceeding phenomenal agency of the body 
is apparent by some results in collision research that included mis-angle reflection 
or  bounding  boxes  not  corresponding  to  action  as  key  problematics  to  the 
collision handling of digital bodies.  19
While some more popular work of this type is to explore object rendering 
by way of an image editor program. For example, Automatic Scene Inference for 
3D Object Compositing contributes an automated process to develop a 3D model 
from a photograph. The program focuses on environmental illumination inference 
 Shashi Shekhas and Xuan Liu, Direction as a Spatial Object: A Summary of Results, (ACM GIS ’98 11/98. 16
University of Minnesota; Washington, DC. USA, 1998), 69. 
 Skekhas and Liu, Direction as a Spatial Object, 70.17
 Skekhas and Lui, Direction as a Spatial Object, 75. 18
 Anthony L. Burrows and David England. “Java 3D, 3D Graphical Environments and Behaviour,” in Software: 19
Practice and Experience 32. (2002), 369.
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and depth estimation. The purpose of modeling to construct realistic compositions 
for human perceivers is pervasive. As such, these specific rendering procedures 
are constructed to optimize and discard inefficient light sources as “guided by 
aesthetic principles” whose ‘realism’ is tested by user participants.20
The chief focus of this review up until now has been to illustrate a rather 
linear  development  of  computation objects.  Now, moving to  a  higher  level  of 
logic, I explore how these digital objects relate to visualization and the body. The 
visualization  of  networked  information  introduces  ideas  of  the  apparatus  in 
multimedia artist and theorist Anna Munster’s  An Aesthesia of Networks (2013). 21
Here, the dynamism of computational objects are explored in the diagram as “an 
immanent  tracing  of  the  qualities  or  traits  of  relations  at  play  and  operates 
aesthetically  across  a  field  — the  recursive  arraying  of  networking.”  These 22
relations display an array of connections that illustrate the limits within object-
oriented  design  principles,  namely  to  encapsulation,  and  for  this  reason,  the 
modeling of relations is inherently aesthetic. Munster divests human perceptibility 
by  questioning  “how do  networks  experience?”  by  looking  at  what  forms  of 
aesthesia persist relationally.  23
 Kevin Karsch, Kalyan Sunkavalli, Sunnil Nadap, Nathan Carr, Hailin Jin, Rafael Fonte, Michael Sittig and 20
David Forsyth. “Automatic Scene Inference for 3D Object Compositing.” ACM Trans. Graph. 33, 3, Article 32 
(May 2014), 7.
 National Institute for Experimental Arts. College of Fine Art, UNSW. Contemporary Culture, Art & Politics 21
(CCAP).
 Anna Munster, An Aesthesia of Networks: Conjunctive Experience in Art and Technology. Technologies of 22
Lived Abstraction. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2013), 37.
 Munster, An Aesthesia of Networks, 623
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Lucy Suchman,  Professor of Anthropology of Science and Technology 24
at  Lancaster  University,  focuses  on  human  computer  interaction  in  Human-
Machine  Reconfigurations:  Plans  and  Situated  Actions  (2007),  as  being 
predominantly useful in establishing knowledge about human understanding. The 
computer artifact is “built on a planning model of human action,” identifying that 
the  problematic  here  is  that  plans  “neither  determine  the  actual  course  of  a 
situated action nor adequately reconstruct it.”  This work defines automata and 25
the  computational  artifact  as  ‘interactive,’ and  increasingly  ‘linguistic’ while 
differentiating  the  mutual  intelligibility  as  unequivocal  between  humans  and 
computers.  Suchman  illustrates  that  there  is  a  disassociation  between  the 
computer as designed and the occasions of its use.26
From the ease and assumption of document transferability, a number of 
transfer protocols were simultaneously developed. “Protocol refers specifically to 
standards governing the implementation of specific technologies.”  Protocol is a 27
management style which is an apparatus of control that “intersects both the digital 
computer  and  the  distributed  network,  two  historical  specific  technologies.”  28
 Lancaster University. Department of Sociology. 24
 Lucille Alice Suchman, Human-Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions. 2nd ed. (Cambridge ; 25
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.
 Suchman, Human-Machine Reconfigurations, 19.26
 Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 27
2004), 7.
 Galloway, Protocol, 243.28
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Protocol  is  practical,  and  as  such  have  been adopted  and implemented  in  the 
design of the computational objects discussed here within.
Sherry Turkle,  Director  of  MIT Initiative on Technology and Self,  in 29
Simulation and Its Discontents (2009) discusses the history of the ‘black box’ or 
‘opaque  software;’  “we  have  a  true  black  box  when  a  statement  is  simply 30
presented as a raw fact without any reference to its genesis or even its author.”  31
Simulations  are  construction  for  and  by  the  visualization  of   scientific  and 
engineering disciplines.  Turkle  puts  forward the view that  the development  of 
designing experiments this way, necessities that nature be “known in advance.”  32
Further, the frame of reference for simulation has no precedents; for these reasons 
“simulation mesmerizes.”  33
This research was inspired by those who focus on the decentering of the 
subject through digital technologies. Considering just one pivotal work,  How We 
Became Posthuman:  Virtual  Bodies  in  Cybernetics,  Literature  and Informatics 
(1999)  by  Katherine  Hayles,  where  it  is  identified  that  “information  lost  its 
body.”  This is a key insight of her research in cybernetics, information theory 34
and computational biology. It is this separation of information from its body, that 
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Program in Science, Technology, and Society.29
 Sherry Turkle, Simulation and Its Discontents (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), 41.30
 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Prahran, Vic.: Re.press, 2009), 37.31
 Turkle, Simulation and Its Discontents, 40.32
 Turkle, Simulation and its Discontents, 51.33
 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 2.34
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leads  to  the  embodiment  of  information  into  the  organic  compounds  and 
subsequently birthing the cyborg. “The posthuman view privileges informational 
pattern over material  instantiation.”  This book denies that  consciousness is  a 35
starting place, rather it is a concurrent phenomenon concluding extension of the 
body as a natural continuation.  “Reflexivity entered cybernetics primary through 36
discussions  about  the  observer,”  birthing  the  theory  of  autopoiesis  —  “that 37
systems are informational closed.”  This thesis is a product of the disembodiment 38
of  information  and  materiality,  it  attempts  to  bridge  the  gap  in  a  new  way. 
“Literary texts are not, of course, merely passive conduits. They actively shape 
what the technologies mean and what the scientific theories signify in cultural 
contexts.”39
Professor and Chair of Modern Culture and Media at Brown University, 
Wendy Chun   in Programmed Visions: Software and Memory (2013) explores 40
code,  interfaces  and  programmability  as  the  ‘embodiment  of  logic.’  Further, 41
compounding upon the role of  metaphor:  memory,  code and genetics,  and the 
gendered histories of computer development are considered.
 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 2.35
 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 2.36
 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 9.37
 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 10. 38
 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 21.39
 Brown University. Modern Culture and Media. History of Art and Architecture. 40
 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Programmed Visions: Software and Memory, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011), 41
176.
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The Biography of the Object  by Sergei Tret’iakov (Russian constructivist 
writer) was written in 1929, “at a time when the champions of the new proletarian 
realism were campaigning for the reinstatement of the sovereign human subject at 
the centre of the fictional narrative.”  The idea being that heroism was only the 42
attribution of a series of events into the actions of one narrator, when in fact, it 
was a multitude of relations the were responsible. “If the traditional novel was 
held together by the hero, the biography of the object was held together by the 
act.”  Trev’iakov  advocated  for  the  object  proceeding  through  a  “system  of 43
people,”  as a method of discussing capital  and production, but also to move 44
away from idealist philosophy.
Landgon Winner  in Do Artifacts  have Politics? (1980) argues against 45
technological  determinism, much to the effort  of author and programmer Alex 
Galloway’s  Protocol, denying the suggestion that there is an internal dynamic 46
that “molds society to fit its patterns.”  Winner offers that “invention, design or 47
arrangement of a specific technical device or system becomes a way of settling an 
issue in a particular community,”  for example, Moses’ low bridge, may be a 48
 Sergei Tret’iakvo, “The Biography of the Object,” in October 118 (2006), 57.42
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manner in which artifacts are political. Another way is to consider artifacts with 
inherently political technologies like, the atomic bomb. I have considered the way 
object orientation is developed through narrative, and pertinent to my thesis,  I 
examine  attributes  not  commonly  considered  to  objects  which  serves  as  a 
transition into other novel conceptualizations. Winner touches on the network as a 
way to attribute unique properties to a multiplicity of objects and systems; “the 
issues that divide or unite people in society are settled not only in the institution 
and  practices  of  politics  proper,  but  also,  and  less  obviously,  in  tangible 
arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and transistors, nuts and bolts.”  49
Accordingly,  Ilana  Gershon  and  Joshua  Malitsky  introduce  the 50 51
theoretical relationality of the actor-network theory (ANT) (“Michel Callon, John 
Law, Madeleine Akrick, Andy Barry, Annemarie Mol, Antoine Hennion”).  They 52
describe the theory as rejecting dichotomies, consider the rehearsed: “self/other; 
material/semiotic;  nature/culture;  agency/structure;  knowledge/power;  active/
passive;  human/non-human;  truth/falsehood.  By rejecting these  dualisms,  ANT 
presumes that  every thing and everyone is  profoundly relational—that  entities 
 Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 128. 49
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only have qualities, attributes or form as a result of their relationships with other 
entities.”53
Graham Harman in the Prince of Networks describes “Latour as a pioneer 
of  object-oriented  philosophy.”  Bruno  Latour’s  philosophy  is  known  for 54 55
positioning all entities as equal, ontologically. “All features belong to the actor 
itself:  a  force  utterly  deployed  in  the  world  at  any  given  moment,  entirely 
characterized by its full set of features.”  If one feature changes, the features of 56
the  world  change;  things  are  utterly  concrete,  they  are  neither  encrusted  nor 
encapsulated. The concreteness of an object is neither irreducible to any other, in 
fact an actant “gain[s] in strength only through their alliances.”  Latour’s things 57
lack a centre, in this way they are vectors—magnitude and direction—or events. I 
love what this does to the construction of an argument: “thinkers do not deduce, 
critique, or build reality out of first principles or foundations. Instead, they simply 
work…”  “There is no such thing for Latour as a ‘becoming’ that would exceed 58
individual  actors.  Nor  is  there  any  ‘virtuality’  that  exceeds  them,  just  as 
potentiality does not exceed them.”  This quote indicates two key features of 59
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Latour’s metaphysical account of actants. First, the notion of becoming requires 
an agency that is unlike the actant. Secondly, what exceeds an individual actant 
would be the body and its ability to potentialize space. Finally, Harman asserts his 
own philosophical treaties, and this is where I pick up the thread, “objects are not 
defined by their  relations:  instead they are what enter  into relation in the first 
place, and their allies can never fully mine their ores.”60
 Harman, Prince of Networks, 132. 60
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III. Representation and Mediating Structure of the Apparatus
In this paper, simulations are prioritized as compatible to ‘nature’ in their 
capacity to model knowledge. Material bodies exist in substance, assuming that 
tactility and realness are attributed to physical objects, whereas intentional objects 
require an observer to think of the object for its substantiation. The duality that 
exists between these real and intentional objects is that the latter is considered 
phenomenal  and  sensual  only  in  the  thought  of  its  intentionality.  This  work 
considers  ways  in  which  sensual  objects  can  be  considered  both  real  and 
intentional. This section investigates how the problematic manifestation of these 
structures is predicated upon representationalism and the mediating structure of 
the apparatus. 
Following readings by Karen Barad, this thesis understands the apparatus 
as a boundary-making practice that reconfigures an object’s reality. Though there 
seems to be no compelling reason to argue for objectivity in epistemology, objects 
are defined as existing as autonomous units in an epistemological domain that 
rests on occasionalism. In turn, occasionalism is predicated upon the assumption 
of causality in a realm that establishes objects as thoroughly autonomous. Objects 
considered thoroughly autonomous are necessarily solipsistic. Occasionalism is a 
response to the problems of causality in a domain of purely autonomous objects, 
asking who is the actor? If objects were entirely autonomous, they would lack 
impetus required for causality.  This is the framework by which digital objects are 
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interpreted  by  contemporary  phenomenologists  and  are  left  both  invalid  and 
unreal.   
III. A. Representationalism 
There has been an ongoing debate about the role of representationalism in 
object  ontologies.  Representationalism  is  “the  ontological  distinction  between 
representations  and  that  which  they  purport  to  represent.”  Scholarship  on 61
representationalism addresses semantic questions about the relationship between 
the referent and language, and in semiotics, between the sign and the signified. In 
semantic  representation,  the  referent  of  an  object  is  “the  entity  referred  to  or 
signified by a word or expression.”  The way that a referent imparts knowledge is 62
different than the object that represents it. Representation is considered to be a 
“mediating function.”  63
The purpose of semiotic theory is to define the process of sign-making and 
interpretation.  Semiotics  is  a  doctrine  of  signs  developed  by  logician  and 
philosopher, Charles Peirce. His theory of signs held that a sign “is something 
which stands to somebody for coming in some respect of capacity.”  That is to 64
say, each sign represents something, in fact three things: “the ground, the object 
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and  the  interpretant.”  Semiotic  theory  operates  on  the  assumption  that  the 65
phenomena  can  transfer  meaning  from  one  sign  to  another.  Theorist  Roland 
Barthes in Elements of Semiology (1964) defines the sign to be a “compound of a 
signifier and a signified.”  Where the signified is a “mental representation of the 66
‘thing’” ;  “… the signifier:  it  is  purely a relatum,  whose definition cannot be 67
separated  from  that  it  signifies.  The  only  difference  is  that  the  signifier  is  a 
mediator: some matter is necessary to it.”  68
Representationalism is also discussed in terms of the duality of subject and 
object  relations;  does  the  object  represent  the  referent  (that  is,  the  subject)  in 
phenomenological experience, or in semiotics? The divide between subject and 
object is important in the discussion of digital objects, which have interiors and 
exteriors.  Representationalism  plays  a  variety  of  roles  in  understanding 
computational  objects  because  the  language  has  a  visual  representation;  the 
referent and the representation are quite different, much in the same way the word 
“rock” is different than the object “rock.” 
The visual representation of a computational object is unlike its name; it is 
not  a  single  predicate  for  the  object.  These  visual  representations  and  their 
referent—being computational code—are also enabled to replicate an object in the 
real word, convoluting the object’s capacity for representing a real thing. I will 
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further discuss these visual representations as graphic events. The epistemological 
understanding of modeling is discussed later, at length, in this chapter. That an 
object is said to represent another leads me to question its accuracy, truthfulness, 
and validity regarding its relationship to reality. The relationships that are being 
scrutinized in representationalism specific to the digital object are both semantic 
and ontological. Semantic representation is to say that meanings are represented 
by words. Specific to the digital object, the semantic representation is the object’s 
relationship to code.
III. B. Referent Modeling
In  this  paper,  I  put  forward  the  claim  that  representationalism  is 
responsible  for  the  dissonance  and  gap  in  referent  modeling  that  occurs  in 
simulation  environments.  In  this  study,  the  discussion  centers  on  whether  the 
target  object  is  modeled  with  ontological  forms,  and  how  those  forms  are 
manifested in the simulation software.  As Paul  Fishwick explains,  “the source 
object models the target, and so, modeling represents a relation between objects. 
Often, the source object is termed the model of the target.”69
Paul Fishwick argues that the set of objects chosen to be a source object in 
model development must provide meaningful metaphors to the modeler to ensure 
the ease of comprehension of the design.  For example, the architectural model 70
 Paul A. Fishwick, “3D Behavioral Model Design for Simulation and Software Engineering,” in On Web-based 69
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was  recommended  as  a  meaningful  visual  metaphor  in  the  development  of 
computer  programs.  The  dramatization  of  such  metaphorical  representation  in 
computer  language  allowed  for  programming  development  to  be  increasingly 
transparent and accessible. Simulations history in metaphorical modeling reflects 
the epistemological intervention in this paper (where simulation is discussed as a 
tool for developing theory).
In this analysis, I ask: is representationalism responsible for dissonance in 
referent modeling? In the analysis on modeling and representation, simulation is 
prioritized. Simulation is “a false assumption or display, a surface resemblance or 
imitation, of something.”   This definition discredits simulation’s use in designing 71
knowledge, as well as its capacity for demonstration; however, this definition is 
useful in considering ways in which distance between the target and model are 
considered  false  representation  while  still  enabling  the  production  and 
dissemination of knowledge. Representationalist ideas administer the assumption 
that  what  is  false  though  justified,  perhaps  lacks  credibility  and  subsequently 
degrade  the  transmission  of  knowledge  through  object  modeling.  Knowledge 
correlates by way of a faculty of understanding that perception has justifications 
of  fact  and  truth.  This  thesis  utilizes  fiction  and  metaphor  to  illustrate  that 72
simulations  falsities  prove  to  be  powerful.  Simulation  helps  to  hypothesize 
possibilities and forecasts the futurity of innovative effects in an environment that 
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is constrained and contained fostering a ‘safe’ environment. It is the precise nature 
of  simulation  that  theoretical  developments  cast  progressive  capacities  for 
“progress  and  futurity  are  the  achievement  of  difference,  the  capacity  for 
techniques to achieve maximum difference.”73
Simulation is considered a virtual reality. Reality itself is tied closely to 
representationalism and materialization—that is, what is real is material, and what 
is real can only be represented and never obtained. This is the understanding of 
both how we perceive objects and think about them. Simulation is a representation 
of reality. Reality underlies all appearance and phenomena, and it provides truth in 
its capacity to correspond to fact—and reality is abysmal.  The fissure between 74
representation and reality is undertaken in correspondence theory: where the truth 
value of the correspondence between fact and reality does not exist between the 
representation-of-reality and reality, that is correspondence does not transfer. This 
fissure is the distance between that which is real, and that which is underneath and 
behind appearance and representation. 
These  correlations—between  the  object  and  its  representation,  and  the 
model  and  its  target—are  evaluated  to  understand  realism  by  correspondence 
theory. This theory that aims to determine the truth value of these relationships 
and define truth in itself. Correspondence theory holds that the definition of truth 
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is that “true propositions correspond to the facts.”  The representations of objects 75
and their correspondence to facts are appraised through validity. Validity is to be 
founded on fact,  and related to the soundness and strength of  an argument or 
proof.  Verification and validation are two modes of measurements to evaluate a 76
simulation’s capacity to represent its target model. These methods of simulation 
appraisal  indicate the ideal  of representationalism—that it  is  possible.  We will 
now evaluate a different mode of understanding representations of objects: the 
apparatus. Through the apparatus, phenomena or appearance becomes an object—
the  referent  itself.  The  problem  with  representationalism  is  its  inescapability. 
Karen  Barad’s  theory  aims  to  dismantle  representationalism  through  the 
apparatus, she asks: how has the apparatus reconfigured the reality of objects?
III. C. Mediating Structure of the Apparatus
Evidence for the apparatus is borne by social theorist and literary critic 
Michel Foucault in an interview in 1977:
the nature of the apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that 
we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces, of a 
rational and concrete intervention in the relations of forces, either so as to 
develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilize them, 
and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a play of 
power, but it is also always linked to certain limits of knowledge that arise 
from it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is precisely 
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this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported 
by, certain types of knowledge.77
The  apparatus  is  a  mediating  structure  that  highlights  operability  or 
disjunction between the model and the target. This study attempts to address the 
problems of the apparatus as reliant on an observer and as a means of description. 
Philosopher  Giorgio Agamben,  in  What is  an Apparatus  (2009),  examines the 
apparatus and its agency by tracing the etymology of the term through Michel 
Foucault  and  back  to  Jean  Hyppolite’s  analysis  of  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich 
Hegel’s interest in natural and positive religion: “to the dialectics of freedom and 
obligation,  as  well  as  of  reason and history.”  The apparatus  is  ontologically 78
without being. It is a device and a process with its subject being a privation; it 
creates what it lacks. Privation is “the condition of being deprived of or lacking an 
attribute or quality formerly or properly possessed; (more generally) the loss or 
absence  of  a  quality.”  This  historical  linage  moderates  processes  of 79
subjectification. Agamben argues that only living substances can be determined or 
intercepted  by  the  apparatus;  this  is  denied  by  Barad’s  conception  of  the 
apparatus, where she would argue that all material has agency.
There are multiple processes of subjectification.  Agamben criticizes the 
contemporary time as suffering from an extreme proliferation of these processes, 
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calling every  personal  identity  a  masquerade.  Agamben’s  apparatus  gains  its 80
agency in division between God and causality, between separating the living from 
the environment. Agency is depicted in this thesis where the simulation enacts 
divisions  of  the  apparatus,  separating  the  digital  object  and  its  environment. 
However, given that the apparatus always produces the subject, interiority, and 
alterity, do digital objects possess an interiority? I explore this question further in 
“Sensual Alterity.”
The social theorist, Agamben view identifies three distinct features of the 
apparatus.  First,  the  apparatus  is  linguistic  and  non-linguistic,  including 
everything from discourse and institutions to roadways and buildings. Second, the 
apparatus is concretely strategic, and as such, it is located in a power relation. 
Finally,  “it  appears  at  the  intersection  of  power  relation  and  relations  of 
knowledge.”  The apparatus is a tool of epistemology, 81
Karen Barad, author of Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics 
and the Entanglement of  Matter and Meaning  (2007) puts  forth the view that 
“apparatuses are constituted through particular practices that are perpetually open 
to rearrangements, rearticulations, and other reworkings.”  Barad’s definition of 82
the  apparatus  is  expansive,  including  “material-discursive  practice  .  .  .  they 
produce  differences  that  matter—they  are  boundary-making  practices.”  The 83
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apparatus  is  more  than  an  instrument  of  measurement  and  its  capacity  to 
reconfigure matter, and potentially, virtuality “result[s] in the production of new 
phenomena,  and so on.”  An apparatus  is  that  which measures  and acts  as  a 84
discursive frame defining and reconfiguring objects in reality.
The apparatus is agentive in that it enacts the possibility or impossibilities 
of  matter’s  reconfiguration.  The  vitality  and  dynamics  that  Barad  introduces 85
speaks to the ways that intra-actions leave marks on bodies as agentive forces. 
The vitality of agency is not “designated as an attribute of subjects or objects”; 
rather,  it  is  “a  matter  of  intra-acting;  it  is  an  enactment,  not  something  that 
someone has or something does. [sic] ”  86
In aiming to characterize the apparatus as Barad does, one can argue that 
the  arena of  observation in  simulation becomes an object  of  observation.  The 
analogy of a walking cane can be used to aid in environmental understanding, one 
uses the cane to explore nuances of the space they’re in or it can be an object of 
inquiry, asking ‘what is this walking cane’? Observation, then, problematizes the 
apparatus tool because it alters its capacity to measure its outcome. “Measurement 
can be said to express particular facts about that which is measured; that is, the 
measurement  is  a  causal  intra-action  and  not  ‘any  old  playing  around.’”  87
Observation  is  more  than  simply  experiencing  an  event;  it  specifically 
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acknowledges causality  in  the discrimination and judgment  of  appearance and 
phenomenon.  Observation  becomes  a  gaze,  and  the  gaze  is  a  tool  of 
subjectification. To portray the issue in Karen Barad’s terms, “phenomena do not 
merely mark the epistemological inseparability of observer and observed, or the 
results of measurements; rather, phenomena are the ontologically inseparability/
entanglement  of  intra-acting  ‘agencies.’”  This  will  become  the  crux  of  my 88
argument. This rejects the empiricist thinking of early modernists that frame the 
object as objective. Phenomena are entangled with the mark making apparatus. 
American philosopher and logician Willard Quine associates observation 
with consciousness: “what to count as observation now can be settled in terms of 
the stimulation of sensory receptors, let consciousness fall where it may.”  This 89
definition from Quine opens the conversation to include other so-called sensory 
bodies for observation—and this can, one could argue, include the digital. The 
question of whether digital objects are sensory bodies has caused little debate in 
contemporary  theory.  A  sensory  body  is  simply  one  that  “belong[s]  to 
sensation.”  90
The  underlying  argument  in  favour  of  Barad’s  reconfiguration  of  the 
notion of the apparatus identifies that one can, without changing the simulation, 
and without changing the apparatus, produce new phenomena by changing what 
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the apparatus is measuring. A phenomenon, such as the appearance of the colour 
red,  was  previously  considered  explicitly  distinct  from real  objects;  that  is,  a 
phenomenon  was  an  object  of  immediacy  understood  through  sensation  and 
perception, thus producing a phenomenal object.  Now, with the reimagining of 91
the  boundary  formation  affected  by  the  apparatus,  Barad  helps  us  to  see 
phenomenon  are  “about  specific  material  configurations  of  the  world’s 
becoming.”  There is ample evidence to support of agential separability that by 92
keeping all measurement assumptions the same, new material is produced.
For instance, modeling and knowledge become products of the apparatus 
responsible for the materialization of simulation, and thus the materialization of 
the  simulated  model.  The simulation  apparatus  is  hard  to  define because  it  is 
consider  boundary-less;  one  can  only  characterize  it  by  the  qualities/marks 
produced. What constitutes the apparatus in the simulation interface is expounded 
in the section “Simulation as Apparatus,” where the precession of the model and 
its capacity for optical consistency are examined. In addition, the section titled 
“Discursive Practice of Rasterization” establishes the computational process of 
rasterization  and  normals  as  “apparatuses  [whose]  specific  material 
configurations,  or rather,  dynamic (re)configurings of the world through which 
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bodies are intra-actively materialized.”  This line of argumentation illustrates the 93
apparatus’ capacity to reconfigure the reality of digital objects.
III. D. Privation of Boundaries
It is also important to note the role of boundaries—or lack thereof—in the 
apparatus. Boundaries demonstrate the limit or bounds of material and immaterial 
things; they “also [are] the limit itself.”  The apparatus is not an instrument or 94
artifact,  because  it  lacks  boundaries:  “apparatuses  are  not  bounded  objects  or 
structures;  they  are  open-ended  practices.”  The  structuring  capacities  of  the 95
apparatus,  though  definitive,  “[focus]  on  the  lack  of  an  inherent  distinction 
between measuring instrument and measured object.”96
The boundaries of objects, specifically a class of objects known as “real” 
objects, have their roots in philosophy’s theories of substance. Namely, through 
Rene Descartes’ skeptical explorations in Mediations on First Philosophy (1641), 
we come to understand that boundaries are defined by the systematic removal of 
properties and descriptions. Properties are “an attribute, character or quality; . . . a 
characteristic which is peculiar to a particular kind of thing but is not part of its 
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essence or definition.”  What remains after the removal of all properties through 97
skeptical  deduction is  a substance (matter)  of extension—a materialism that  is 
static and monolithic. Extension is the length, width, and thickness of matter in 
space. The boundaries of an object are thus defined by their capacity, not agency, 
to inform the taking of space.
The difference between real objects and digital objects is not as clear-cut 
as popular views of materialism might suggest. A digital object is not mutable or 
informed by substantiation (the process of being a substance)—as such, it is not 
considered an object of unified reality. Nor does it engage with the world in the 
manner I conceptualize that the physical object engages in, as physical objects’ 
boundaries, inert and definitive, are considered restricted by natural law. Digital 
objects’ boundaries rely upon the apparatus to be distinct and delineated from the 
environment and for their instantiation (quasi-substantiation) in code.
The forgoing discussion implies that boundaries created by the apparatus 
are divisions between objects and their environments. In the following, I will set 
up object-oriented ontology (OOO) theory that  advocates for  the autonomy of 
objects. When discussing the autonomy of objects, apropos to the suppositions 
asserted  in  Graham  Harman’s  theories  (to  be  discussed),  I  question  if  the 
restrictive  domain  of  OOO  affects  one’s  understanding  of  digital  objects  as 
objective.  This  thesis  then  argues  for  a  larger  domain  of  inquiry  for  the 
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consideration  and  inclusion  of  digital   objects  into  current  object-oriented 
ontologies. And also for the expansion of scope as it effects the apparatus.
III. E. OOO Neighbourhood
OOO  is  popular  in  contemporary  philosophy  not  only  because  of  its 
“political  thesis  to  the  effect  that  all  objects  ought  to  be  treated  equally”;  98
additionally, a central claim is the namesake of philosopher Levi R. Bryant’s  The 99
Democracy of Objects—the philosophy for the democracy of all objects. Bryant 
argues that  “flat ontology refuses to privilege the subject-object, human-world 
relation as either a) a form of metaphysical relation different in kind from other 
relations between objects, and that b) refuses to treat the subject-object relation as 
implicitly included in every form of object-object relation.”  OOO identifies an 100
“object that is for-itself rather than an object that is an opposing pole before or in 
front of a subject.”  101
OOO is a “polarized” philosophy in which “objects exist as autonomous 
units, but they also exist in conjunction with their qualities, accidents, relations, 
and moments without being reducible to these.”  There are four key tensions 102
that Harman addresses in his metaphysical defence of objects; first is that objects 
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are not “derivative of a primal whole”; secondly, “objects are irreducible to their 
pieces and have a genuine emergent reality”; thirdly, “objects are irreducible to 
their appearance in human consciousness”; finally, “objects are irreducible to their 
relations with other things.”103
While OOO helps us to see the tension in an object, it does a disservice in 
its  conceptualization  of  the  domain  in  which  objects  are  situated.  Again,  in 
speculative realism, occasionalism is discussed as a mode to engage in object-to-
object  relations.  Speculative  realism  is  prefaced  by  three  principles  that  are 
specific to object-oriented philosophy. First, philosophy ought not privilege types 
of objects. Second, “all contact between objects must be indirect or vicarious.”  104
Finally,  polarizing  occurs  between  objects  and  qualities,  as  well  as  real  and 
sensual  objects.  These  speculative  realism  principles  are  confounded  in  the 
simulation  case  studies  of  this  thesis  because  of  the  tensions  between  digital 
objects, and their internalism of code.
In other words, OOO presupposes objectivity meaning the impartiality of 
observation is required for the interaction of objects.  Objects’ autonomy is so 
thorough  that  it  excludes  their  capacity  to  be  actors  upon  other  infinitely 
autonomous  objects—hence,  occasionalism.  Moreover,  there  seems  to  be  no 
compelling reason to argue for objectivity, regardless of the potential domain of 
virtuality for the object. Objectivity is “the quality or character of being objective; 
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esp.  the  ability  to  consider  or  represent  facts,  information,  etc.,  without  being 
influenced by personal feelings or opinions; impartiality.”  Objectivity has been 105
criticized  by  feminist  scholars  for  bias  of  impartiality.  Feminist  philosopher 
Lousie M. Antony , in “Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import of Naturalized 106
Epistemology,” expresses that “the conception of objectivity that is ultimately the 
object  of  radical  critique—perfect  impartiality—is  only  supportable  as  an 
epistemic ideal on an empiricist conception of mind.”  Some feminist scientists 107
disagree, and I think Barad would concur that the acceptance of this ideal begins 
with faith in the efficacy of “existing methodological norms of science.”  Barad 108
concludes that “objectivity cannot be about producing undistorted representations 
from  afar;  rather,  objectivity  is  about  being  accountable  to  the  specificity  of 
materialization of which we are a part.”109
The main theoretical premise behind object-oriented philosophy rests on 
externalist theories.  This view holds that the truth conditions of a proposition are 
dependent  upon  justified  evidence  in  the  external  world.  Joe  Lau  and  Max 110
Deutsch  describe “externalism with regard to mental content says that in order 111
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to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be 
related to  the environment  in  the right  way.”  The “right  way” is  an argued 112
tradition; be it through empiricism or idealism, “knowledge is then achieved, it 
appears,  not  by  active  engagement  with  one’s  world  .  .  .  but  by  the  pristine 
transcendence of the messy contingencies of the human condition.”113
III. F. Consequence for Digital Objects
I will now summarize the ground covered in this section by addressing 
how these frameworks justify the static and immutable definition of objects.  I 
have shown representationalism as responsible for dissonance between object and 
model. This hypothesis infers that digital objects are unreal and invalid, premised 
on the discontinuity brought by representationalism. The externalism requirement 
of an observer for the objectivity of digital objects necessitates the digital object’s 
status as unreal. In an effort to communicate digital objects’ autonomy, I suggest 
that the apparatus fulfills the role of observer, instantiating attributes/marks upon 
the digital body that exist without the necessity of a human observer. Establishing 
the digital object as an object ought to be considered in popular object-oriented 
ontologies. 
These operative frameworks that define objects leave the simulated object 
as no more than a metaphor.  Metaphors “make us attend to some links,  often 
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novel or surprising likeness, between two or more things.”  Metaphors extend 114
the original meaning in some manner that is unique, or metaphorical—“there is no 
similarity  to  seek because it  consists  simply in  being referred to  by the same 
word.”  If  objects  are  invalid  and  unverified,  and  metaphor  is  yet  another 115
representationalist ideal, then this has allowed us to discuss digital objects in a 
meaningful manner that take into account the links between digital and physical 
objects.
This constructs simulation as a thing lacking a practice for measuring the 
validity of the target object (produced) and the modeled object (referent). There is 
a  representationalist  problem  with  the  justification  between  the  model  of  the 
physical world and the simulation program. This comparison of semantics and 
physical  objects,  supports  digital  objects  as  being  in-between  material  objects 
(with similar objectness and epistemological frameworks for understanding them) 
as  well  as  in-between  intentional  objects,  which  require  an  observer.  The 
intentionality  of  objecthood is  a  product  of  Descartes’ Meditations,  where  the 
subject  is  separated  from the  body.  This  is  compounded by the  notion of  the 
apparatus as always producing an interiority or subject through its agentive action. 
These  forces  of  objectness  through  the  division  of  form and  matter,  produce 
intentionality of a digital object; first from our epistemological understanding of 
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objects  being  inherently  exterior.  What  I  argue  is  that  a  digital  object  is 
somewhere in-between intentional and real. 
Further,  the ways in which these digital  or  real  and substantial  objects 
relate  to  one  another  within  closed  arenas  of  reality—be  these  causal  or 
phenomenal domain—the ways in which they remain meaningless, as they are 
separated from signification, and separated from the world. 
 40
IV. Applied Assemblage
IV. A. Agential Separability 
In  Barad’s  Meeting  the  Universe  Halfway:  Quantum  Physics  and  the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (2007) discussion of the posthuman, she 
makes it apparent that epistemologies are anchored in the measure of man, and it 
is suggested that formal and natural ontologies can extend beyond the necessity of 
a human cognizer. What a posthumanist performative approaches diverts attention 
from the  “correspondence  between description  and  reality  .  .  .   to  matters  of 
practices, doings, and actions.”  This is useful to my understanding of objects 116
because the attention is not correspondence of truth values, rather the process by 
which objects are understood to relate.  The predicate of truth is removed as a 
redundancy. 
The main theoretic premise behind Barad’s chaotic/entanglements is the 
universal concept. The universe is “all existing matter, space, time, energy, etc., 
regarded  collectively,  esp.  as  constituting  a  systematic  or  ordered  whole;  the 
whole  of  creation,  the  cosmos;  the  totality  of  things  under.”  This  universal 117
concept  has  been  addressed  in  speculative  realism,  and  in  the  occasionalist 
accounts required in object-oriented ontologies. The space of simulation can be 
viewed as similar to the idea of an atomistic space—points in space and time. 
Each point is situated in a coordinate system that corresponds to width and depth. 
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The data yielded by Barad’s study indicates that the domain is much larger—in 
fact, it is infinite. 
The key tool that Barad offers is agential separability. This relates to the 
agent and its  agency, as well  as the empirical  matter that  is  being configured. 
Barad describes a dynamism of the reconfiguration of phenomena as agency—
agency is not an attribute. The tangential cut problematically separates subject and 
object, which she refers to as agential separability; it is required for the possibility 
of objectivity in science practices, for example.  As Barad states, “a condition 118
for objective knowledge is that the referent is a phenomenon.”119
Barad  developed  a  claim  that  agential  separability  is  a  mode  or 
performance  in  which  the  “apparatuses  enact  agential  cuts  that  produce 
determinate  boundaries  and  properties  of  ‘entities’ within  phenomena,  where 
‘phenomena’  are  the  ontological  inseparability  of  agentially  intra-acting 
components.”  The phenomena then, are inseparable from both the boundaries 120
determined by the cut, but also from the intra-acting (causal) components them 
selves.   Agential  separability  is  “the  condition  of  exteriority-within-
phenomena.”  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  phenomena,  though  objective 121
given its exteriority, are not “objects-in-themselves”; rather, they are intra-actions. 
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Intra-action  “signifies  the  mutual  constitution  of  entangled  agencies.”  122
Entanglements are in a manner the way particles correlate, yet this term is specific 
to quantum physics where “they specify a feature of particle behaviour for which 
there is no classical physics equivalent.”   In this way, the empirical objective 123
referent is phenomena. 124
Barad puts forth the claim that “apparatuses are not bounded objects or 
structures;  they  are  open-ended  practices.”  The  reconfiguring  of  the  world 125
continues  without  end;  “matter’s  dynamism  is  inexhaustible,  exuberant,  and 
prolific.”  This quotation follows Barad's definition of apparatus as a practice 126
empowered  with  causation  to  which  matter  is  articulated  via  differentiation, 
reconfiguring  a  “field  of  possibilities”  in  an  ongoing  movement  of  agency.  127
Barad  defines:  “apparatuses  provide  the  conditions  for  the  possibility  of 
determinate  boundaries  and  properties  of  ‘objects’ within  phenomena,  where 
‘phenomena’ are  the  ontological  inseparability  of  objects  and  apparatuses 
[sic].”  The  apparatus  is  both  the  potentiality  of  and  inseparable  from 128
phenomenal intra-actions. The boundaries of an object are inseparable from the 
apparatus responsible for its cut. 
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The domain of possibility for the reality of objectness is not determinate 
for  Barad,  as  her  theory  reconfigures  entirely  the  common  understanding  of 
causality. Where OOO requires an account of occasionalism to account for the 
incapacity of objects to be causal actors based on their autonomous definition, 
Barad  enacts  objectivity  and  causality  through  the  agentive  intra-actions. 
Previously  held  conceptions  of  the  boundaries  of  objects  are  enmeshed  in 
substantiation via extension; Barad’s causality allows for phenomenal entities as 
bounded in themselves. It  is not a specific entity that marks an “effect” on an 
object; rather, the marks are “said to constitute a measurement of specific features 
of the object (the cause).”  Again, measurements are intra-active mark-making 129
actants; “either way, what is important about causal intra-actions is that ‘marks are 
left on bodies.’”  In the next section, I will introduce the argument for assessing 130
these bodies as sensual. 
IV. B. The Sensible Object
A guiding research objective for this thesis led me to assemble the ways in 
which contemporary theory produced sensible qualities in digital objects. I assert 
that practical sensation is different from the sensible objects proposed here after 
that  I  am  attempting  to  illuminate.   Theorist  Elizabeth  Grosz  in  Chaos, 131
Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth, draws from philosophers 
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Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,  outlining important distinctions between the 
aesthetics and affective and phenomenological  uses for our productions of art. 
What is proposed is an account of sensation as a body of artwork, arguing that 
sensation is not in the receiver; rather, that “sensation draws us, living beings of 
all  kinds,  into  the  artwork  in  a  strange  becoming  in  which  the  living  being 
emptied itself of its interior to be filled with the sensation of that work alone.”  132
Here, the relation of practical sensation is still implied; however, I would like to 
consider this relation of sensual becoming posited by Grosz to include all bodies, 
specifically digital object bodies, whose interior is emptied and becomes a body in 
becoming sensation. 
Perception is defined as a “bodily relation between states of things and 
subjects.”  Affect for Grosz is tied to the materiality of the human body, and that 133
affect  is  the calling or  coming to  know the animal  urgency of  sensation.  Yet, 
Claire Colebrook  expounded Deleuze’s conception of sensation in Deleuze: A 134
Guide for the Perplexed (2006) by stating that 
percepts and affects are not continuous with life and are not effects of a 
synthetic activity of consciousness. Affects and percepts stand alone and 
bear  an  autonomy  that  undoes  any  supposed  independence  of  self-
constituting consciousness: “we attain to the percept and the affect only as 
to autonomous and sufficient beings that no longer owe anything to those 
who experience them or who have experienced them.”[3]  135
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Grosz  describes  sensation  as  “the  zone  of  indeterminacy between subject  and 
object, the bloc that erupts from the encounter of the one with the other.”  Thus, 136
sensation  is  separate  from  the  bodily  experience  of  affect  and  percepts  and 
“requires no mediation or translation. It is not representation, sign, symbol, but 
force, energy, rhythm, resonance.”  This description of sensation is useful in my 137
attempt to define sensation as being something that is autonomous and outside of 
the relationality of human perception. The definition of sensation I have provided 
takes it a step further by distancing itself from understanding as a representational 
process. The next section specifically describes the sensible object as something 
more than representing a real object. 
There  is  rapidly  growing  literature  on  object-oriented  ontology,  which 
indicates a revival of interest of metaphysical object ontologies. Graham Harman 
composes complexity in (2011) on the ontology of objects when he uncovers, with 
polarizing clarity, the tensions of real and sensual objects: “What formal ontology 
is concerned in is not so much the bare existence of certain individuals, but rather 
the  rigorous  description  of  their  forms.”  Real  objects  endure  “having  an 138
objective  existence;  actually  existing  physically  as  a  thing,  substantial;  not 
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imaginary.”  The substantial  qualifier of extension in turn will  be refuted,  as 139
objects are made composite through Harman’s ontology. Real objects are said to 
withdraw  from  access—Heidegger  calls  this  “veiled,”  Husserl  calls  this 
“hidden”—whereas sensual objects are available for presence,  appearance,  and 
experience,  Harman’s  sensual  objects  are  considerably  more  than  phenomenal 
appearance.  Appearances can be removed from sensual objects,  indicating that 
they are more than the sum of their  parts,  and thus uncovering a real  sensual 
object  as  different  from  its  sensual  qualities.  Harman’s  central  argument  is 
premised on the assumption that “objects [exist] in their own right, as autonomous 
from their relations with other things.”  As such, the definition of an object is 140
not a bundle of descriptions situated by way of relations; “objects need not be 
natural, simple, or indestructible. Instead, objects will be defined only by their 
autonomous  reality.”  This  is  a  striking  contrast  from  the  historical 141
understanding of the indivisibility of substances by way of Aristotle. 
I am hypothesizing the separation of sensual and intentional objects. “In 
all phenomenal experience, there is a tension between sensual objects and their 
sensual  qualities.”  The sensual  object  is  modeled  after  Husserl’s  intentional 142
object—with  notable  exceptions.  An  intentional  object  “pertain[s]  to  the 
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operations of the mind; mental; existing in or for the mind.”  The intentional 143
object  is  a  form  of  thought  whose  attributes  or  phenomenal  expression  exist 
without  coherence  of  the  natural/real  world.  Yet,  these  “intentional  species, 
appearances or images [are] supposed to be emitted by material objects so as to 
strike  the  senses  and  produce  sensation.”  These  representations  are 144
presentations of something. 
I  am calling upon the theories  of  Graham Harman and his  analysis  of 
Heidegger’s  objects  to  develop  evidence  for  the  sensual  digital  object  theory. 
Heidegger’s real objects are expounded in Harman’s analysis, the central claim is 
that “entities withdraw into a silent underground while also exposing themselves 
to presence” —here, the significance is indicating that a real object cannot be 145
known empirically, rather only the phenomenal appearance or ‘presence’ of an 
object is revealed. This quotation articulates the polarizing of real qualities and 
sensual qualities in order to separate an object from its phenomenal properties. 
Sensual objects are available to consciousness, but with a caveat: they are not 
dependently  known  by  consciousness.  The  system  by  which  the  object  is 
constructed operates on the notion that objects are autonomous. The object that is 
proposed by Heidegger is a sensual object which upon Harman expands. 
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The relationship  between objects  is  sensual  because,  although it  is  not 
entirely mind-independent,  it  requires  other  relationality  for  its  presence to  be 
known.  How  I’ve  altered  this  conception  is  to  include  Barad’s  notion  that 
phenomena  are  objects.  Objectivity  relates  to  a  phenomenal  object.  Sensual 
objects are objectivity, because of their impartiality, and to reiterate Quine’s claim 
that empirical evidence—scientific evidence—is sensual. It is precisely the case 
that  the  determination  and  requirement  of  an  observer  is  not  necessary  for  a 
sensual object. According to Harman, the sensual object doesn't retreat from—
rather, it presents or announces. It is in the unveiling, in its presence of exteriority 
that an object can be said to be sensual. Real objects’ exteriority cannot be known 
regardless of the type of knower it is, independent of that relationship—in this 
place, one can question if internal/external discussion pertains to real objects.
The method that Harman uses to differentiate a sensual object from an 
intentional object is reductive reasoning; he recognizes sensual objects as being 
more (or less, but other) than the sum of their qualities. This skeptical reduction 
alerts his focus to tensions that exist in the sensual object between their sensual or 
accidental  and  real  or  essential  qualities.  The  divergence  is  that  accidental 146
qualities lie directly before an observer, and essential qualities do not.  These 147
sensual  and accidental  qualities “shift  .  .  .  nearly at  will  without affecting the 
character of the object.”  However, essential qualities are eidetic qualities, and 148
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they do not lie “before us in experience.”  These eidetic features cannot be made 149
present via intuition or intellect. Eidetic features are the real qualities of sensual 
objects. These real qualities, like objects veiled within Heidegger’s philosophy, 
can only be “inferred indirectly rather than witnessed.”  This means that objects 150
by this reading require a human cognizer for their reality. These tensions surpass 
the substantial materialization and the antiquated notion of object singularity; here 
we can realize the phenomenal existence of objects without reliance on causally.
This section introduced the tangential cut of agential separability by Karen 
Barad as a methodology for this discourse. It is a mode or a performance that is 
the metaphysical operant for “exteriority with-in phenomena.” The apparatus is 
characterized as a practice empowered with causation. The objects for which these 
tools will be employed are products of Graham Harman’s Quadruple Object—a 
speculative realist project that polarizes real objects adjacent sensual objects—it is 
by  way of  praxis  that  these  real  objects  are  made objects  of  presence.  These 
working definitions of objects, tensions, and qualities will be mapped upon digital 
objects in an effort to discover and diagram areas of cohesion and dissonance. 
Through out this analysis, I will argue for the presence of sensual boundaries of 
digital objects. This thesis employs the method of agential separability coupled 
with  the  analyses  of  digital  objects  as  neither  within  nor  without  the  digital 
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environment, but differentiated from it, in order to argue that agential separability 
creates sensual boundaries within the simulation.
IV. C. Epistemological Intervention
In  order  to  exemplify  phenomenal  boundaries  in  simulation  systems,  I 
answer the call of writer and philosopher Brian Massumi  to contort scientific 151
experimentation. While there may be dissenters to this view among the digital 
humanities discipline, for discussion, I contend that the humanities’ adoption of 
the scientific systems is of a “piece-meal” approach.  This scientific piece-meal 152
is leveraged against the humanities by Brian Massumi in Parables for the Virtual 
(2002) suggesting: 
they will isolate an attractive scientific or mathematical concept and add it 
to  the  repertoire  of  their  own  disciplinary  system  like  an  exotic  pet. 
Scientists might rightly object that the concept has ceased to have anything 
remotely scientific about it and is just functioning as a metaphor . . . where 
it suffers an exemplary kind of creative violence.  153
Simulation environments allow theorists to examine, predict, and dramatize their 
hypotheses  and  subsequent  consequences  outside  of  the  “real  world.”  When 
modeling for an exploratory use, there is purpose and creation—it is the model for 
the  future.  The model  represents  a  likeness,  or  rather,  it  provides  a  mode for 
interpretation.  Simulation as a method of intervention and theory construction, 
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becomes a fiction—“we may come to see a pattern in the facts through the lens 
that a fiction supplies.”  Epistemologist Catherine Elgin , examines the models 154 155
of  truth  in  epistemological  inquires,  concluding  that  “felicitous  falsehoods 
configure a domain, enabling us to characterize the phenomena in what that would 
otherwise be unavailable.”  That is to say that simulation, as previously defined, 156
pertains  to  a  falsity  or  appearance,  but  these  phenomena  would  otherwise  be 
unavailable. The manner in which the phenomenon of simulation experimentation 
is not impervious to its innovative history, namely, in the use of simulation in the 
scientific  modeling  of  biological  molecules  and  nuclear  energy;  some 
environments  are  too  precious—and  most  are  too  complex—to  construct 
experiments in.
I  will  use  simulation  to  map  theory  to  its  particular  features  and 
assumptions  of  observable  phenomena.  Jason  P.  Davis ,  Kathleen  M. 157
Eisenhardt , and Christopher B. Bingham  outline how one can define the logic 158 159
and assumptions of  theories  and alter  variables  in  Developing Theory through 
Simulation Methods (2007). Davis et al has argued that one could take a simple 
theory, define its constructs, and link it throughout the simulation while ensuring 
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to meaningfully represent the descriptions of objects inherent in the simulation; in 
other words, creating computational representations is how one utilizes simulation 
in theory development.
This thesis takes aforementioned considerations of the theory of objects 
and links them in a straightforward way, using the constructs and descriptions of 
objects upon their simulated twins: digital objects. It is based on Lucy Suchman’s 
view of self-explanatory artifacts. As she argues, “the degree to which an artifact 
is self-explanatory is just the extent to which someone examining the artifact is 
able to reconstruct the designer’s intentions regarding its use,”  the “intentions” 160
being that the digital object is modeled from a physical object. Davis et al (2007) 
provides  a  roadmap for  theoretical  development  by defining activities  used to 
create computational representation that “operationalize[s] theoretical constructs” 
and to conduct “robustness checks of computational representation.”  In other 161
words, “the software code should embody the theoretical logic,”  and this lens is 162
applied to breve. Davis et al argues that  “overall, the key point of verification is to 
ensure that the computational representation accurately represents the underlying 
theoretical  logic.”  In  the  section,  “Digital  Object  Architecture,”  I  provide  a 163
description of the digital object as an enumerative effort to confirm the accuracy 
 Lucille Alice Suchman, Human-Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions. (Cambridge ; New 160
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 43.
 Davis, Jason P., Kathleen M. Eisenhardt and Christopher B. Bingham. “Developing Theory through 161
Simulation Methods.” Academy of Management Review 32, no. 2 (2007): 482
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 491.162
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 492.163
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and  internal  validity  of  the  theories  herewith  chosen  to  fit  the  simulation 
environment and approach that is broadly embodied in breve. 
The  research  questions  proposed  in  the  case  studies  were  intended  to 
analyze  the  simple  processes,  performances,  or  phenomena  according  to  the 
systems modeled in the simulation.  This thesis simulation approach explores 164
case studies that operate through “NK fitness landscapes,” “genetic algorithms,” 
and  in  one  instance,  “cellular  automata.”  Each  of  these  processes  will  be 165
unpacked in the case studies section of the thesis. Experimentation in simulation 
through theory occurs in four ways according to Davis et al: first they suggest 
“varying  the  value  of  constructs  that  were  held  constant  in  the  initial  simple 
theory”;  secondly, “unpacking key theoretical constructs . . . breaking a single 166
construct  into  constituent  component  constructs”;  thirdly,  “varying 167
assumptions”;  and  finally,  “adding  new  features  to  the  computational 168
representation.”  “Experimentation  is  closely  associated  with  building  theory 169
using “disciplined imagination.”170
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 485.164
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 487-488.165
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 493.166
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 493.167
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 493.168
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 493.169
 Davis et al., Developing Theory through Simulation Methods, 494. Citing Weick from Theory Construction as 170
Disciplined Imagination, 1989. 
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From here, I appease Massumi’s call for action: I attempt to poach from 
science,  while  betraying  its  system  of  design.  The  most  routine  access  to 171
simulation is through the graphical events on the computer screen. Nevertheless, 
rational access is available through a variety of data outputs. I will address select 
back-end  ontological  components  of  digital  objects  such  as  the  role  of  code; 
however, mostly I access breve demonstrations via the screen.
IV. D. Simulation as Apparatus
I  will  look at  the  precession  of  models  and optical  consistency within 
simulation  as  a  demonstration  of  the  apparatus.  A  simulation  provides  the 
reconstruction of target objects into a simulated or virtual space. In Simulacra and 
Simulation (1981), postmodern thinker Jean Baudrillard outlines the quest for the 
real as a fallout of representationalism. Baudrillard identifies that “simulation is 
characterized by a precession of the model.”  What Baudrillard is suggesting in 172
his characterization is that the model supplants reality. Simulation requires two 
models:  the  target  object  and  the  world  frame.  Both  validity  and  justification 
principles are applied to the ways that these models are said to refer.  Just the 
same, simulation implements a world frame that is a structured domain in which 
digital objects are enframed.
 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 20.171
 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 16.172
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In order to emphasize the powerful perspective simulation affords us, I 
refer  to  Bruno  Latour  (1986)  who  generalizes  that  powerful  explanations  of 
science are efficient. The instruments, literature, and all scholastic achievements 
have end results in common: inscriptions, i.e., graphs or diagrams. An attribute of 
inscriptions is  the “keeping in place” of  both “scientific methods” and “world 
views.”  A key issue in Latour’s description of inscription is the role of optical 173
consistency. Optical consistency allows for accounts of variance in perspective 
and changes in spatial location while not changing the model. For simulation, the 
access point for observation requires a different perspective from the world frame 
being modeled. Importantly, this transition in perspective for it to be successful 
must ensure that the rotation and accession through different positions does not 
change the properties  of  the  object.  If  this  were to  occur,  the  transmission of 
knowledge would be unobtainable. Optical consistency sustained by inscription is 
a component apparatus for objectivity, and it’s why we privilege sight. 
This  notion  of  optical  constancy  could  possibly  clarify  how  the 
observational entry point is static (screen) and different from the way the object is 
framed within the simulation. That is to say the orientation of the world frame, the 
object frame, and the frame of access are all different. Simulation accommodates 
the sought-after Archimedean point sought after by viewers by leveraging their 
access outside of the world frame. Using Barad’s terms, we can imagine this line 
to be a cut that is employed by the apparatus, that illustrates the “inseparability of 
 Bruno Latour, “Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together,” Knowledge and Society Studies in the 173
Sociology of Culture Past and Present 6 (1986): 3
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observer and observed.”  This unique observational viewpoint allows observers 174
to  step  out  of  their  inescapable  world  frame.  ““Give  me  a  place  to  stand,” 
Archimedes is said to have promised, “and I will move the world.”” 175
 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 139.174
 Judson Knight, "Archimedes and the Simple Machines That Moved the World,” Gale Virtual Reference 175
Library. Science and Its Times, Ed. Neil Schlager and Josh Lauer. Vol. 1: 2,000 B.C. to A.D. 699. Detroit: Gale, 
2001, 363-365. Web. http://ezproxy-library.ocad.ca/login?URL=http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE
%7CCX3408500380&sid=summon&v=2.1&u=toro37158&it=r&p=GVRL&sw=w&asid=ae8081ac9b791f2e40e1d
0ca4ec109bb (Accessed February 22 2016).
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V. Biography of Breve
I will  be examining the simulation software called breve because of its 
behaviour-rich  simulation  and  focus  on  object  oriented  collaboration.  While 
researching  foundational  computer  aesthetics,  I  looked  to  artists  who  wrote 
programs  and  designed  utilities  for  graphic  representations  that  contributed 
significantly to the ways algorithms build images; two key figures were digital art 
pioneer Manfred Mohr and computer graphics artist  and researcher Karl Sims. 
Breve replicates the walking behaviours of the multi-body creatures first executed 
by Karl Sims in his seminal release Evolved Virtual Creatures (1994). Breve is 
one of six or  so popular  agent-based modeling systems of its  time (StarLogo, 
Repast, MASON, Swarm, Digital Spaces, and Framsticks) and is no longer being 
debugged or maintained by its makers.  In fact, one is hard-pressed to find a 176
downloadable  and executable  file,  and most  of  the  support  documentation  for 
breve is no longer searchable. While the question is outside of the scope of this 
work, one can wonder which of these lost software are preserved and why, and 
with what value are computational objects chosen to be resurrected?
Artificial intelligence researcher Jon Klein designed breve at MIT in 2002, 
as an open-source, multi-agent simulation software for decentralized systems and 
artificial life. To introduce breve, I will be performing a cognitive walkthrough by 
running demonstrations to provide a user-focused descriptive analysis of some of 
the  simulation’s  capabilities  and  the  interfaces.  Given  that  my  computer 
 Jon Klein and Lee Spector, “3D Multi-Agent Simulations in the Breve Simulation Environment,” Artificial Life 176
Models in Software, edited by Maciej Komosinski and Andrew Adamatzky (2009): 84.
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programming skills are still growing, I view the environmental affordances as key 
components that help me understand how breve invites users to make objects and 
how on can understand objets made as sensual.
breve’s underlying programming language operates with Python, C++, and 
Steve. Despite the complexity of these languages, breve’s design mandate created 
the application to be approachable for those whom do not possess programming 
literacy.  Such  affordances  allow  the  interface  to  be  user-friendly  yet  also 
transparent for those who code by allowing access to the command screen. breve, 
like  many  computer  programs,  transposes  and  adopts  English  vocabulary  for 
descriptions  and  functions.  For  example,  when  describing  a  virtual  stage,  or 
hyperplane, the program uses theatre terminology, including “actors,” “scripts,” 
and  “scenes.”  This  is  significant,  demonstrating  the  platform’s  reliance  on 
metaphor for the development of programs and visualizations.
The  software’s  desktop  environment  opens  three  windows:  a  graphics 
window,  text  terminal,  and dialogue box.  The main menu bar  hosts  the  usual 
suspects: file, edit, demos, font, window, tools, speed, simulation, and help. The 
graphic window is black and displays a toolbar; rotate, zoom, move, and select are 
buttons  for  altering the  cursor  mode.  To the  right,  users  find a  stop and play 
button,  and  finally,  a  scroll  bar  listing  the  text  terminal  names  of  programs 
available  to  run.  The text  terminal  window’s title  bar  displays  the title  of  the 
programmed demonstration to be ran, and users have the option of choosing a 
portion of code according to a “go to line” or to select via method. The third and 
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final screen appears when a program is selected to run, and here an output log is 
recorded. This window is where error messages inform the user of problems with 
the simulation code. In some manner, this interface responds to the nature of the 
simulation being developed for programmers—it is still available as a back-end as 
opposed to the black box intuitive interfaces of today.
This thesis draws on the analysis of syntheses between the graphical event 
of the digital object and construction of digital objects in juxtaposition with the 
object  ontologies  of  contemporary  and  traditional  philosophies.  The  thesis 
explores demonstration files available in breve by illustrating areas in which the 
computational representation embodies the theoretical logic of sensual exteriority.
The demonstrations are  ready-made simulations that  will  act  by giving 
explanation and fostering understanding by way of example.  In the course of 177
this study, I will examine a variety of programming examples in the section on 
“Sensual  Alterity.”  One  demo  explores  object  construction  through  a  static 
simulation  of  joint-type  demonstrations,  exemplifying  how  objects  are 
composited.  Additionally,  creatures  is  a  multi-body  simulation  demonstration 
illustrating emergent walking behaviours. These digital objects are class described 
as  multi-bodies  and  are  constructed  of  multiple  objects.  Plus,  there  are  two 
swarming  demonstrations  that  emphasize  complex  behaviours  appearing  as  a 
gestalt  gesture  of  individual  particles.  The  swarming  demonstrations  will  be 
specifically  useful  in  describing  important  collisions  and  neighbour  detection 
 "demonstration, n.,” OED Online. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49841?redirectedFrom=demonstration 177
(Accessed February 18, 2016).
 60
methods. Each of these demonstrations has a yellow star marked with the word 
“start”—perhaps  at  the  centre  of  the  simulation—which  situates  the  place  in 
which users or digital objects begin their competitions. 
Stable conceptual space is useful for the user’s acquisition of knowledge, 
which is a simulation’s ultimate purpose. The containment provided by this space 
is  necessary  for  the  digital  object  to  persist.  The  simulation  environment  is 
constructed  with  representations  of  the  physicalities  that  occur  in  our  natural 
world.  Natural  laws  like  gravity  and  viscosity  exist  as  ready-mades  in  the 
simulation environment, however, these ‘laws’ can be violated. The base of the 
visualization of the simulation has a ground whose rigidity can be challenged by 
users—objects  can  be  pulled  through,  indicating  the  malleability  of  these 
simulated,  environmental  laws.  Under  the  simulations  menu,  one  can  select 
alterations for many demonstrations; for example, “gravity” has four selections: 
soft, hard, double, or no gravity. Amusingly, the “no gravity” environment is not 
exclusive to viscosity, and as such, the walking multi-bodies of creatures learn to 
swim. The coordinates of this space are finite, much like an aquarium, and in the 
distance a horizon line is met by flat mirages of distant mountains. 
Dirk  Helbing  and  Stefano  Balietti  argue  (2011)  that  agent-based 178 179
simulations are suitable for detailed hypothesis testing. This work identifies agent-
based modeling as suited to modeling social mechanisms of humans. Behaviours 
 ETH Zurich. Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences.178
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and properties are represented in an agent via rules, and these are not limited to: 
“birth, eating and reproduction, individual needs of resources, competition and 
fighting ability, perception, curiosity, exploration behaviour, ability for innovation, 
emotions . . . communication . . . [and] the tendency to have relationships with 
other  agents.”  breve  is  used  to  simulate  complex  social  systems,  particle 180
systems, 3D imports, and evolved fitness creatures. This simulation software has 
additional uses, “including physically simulated evolving creatures [11], evolving 
ecologies [10], swarm robotics [6, 42], artificial intelligence applied to homeland 
security applications [43], simulations of sorting behaviours in ants [5], cognitive 
science research [4], and self-assembly in physical systems [2].181
V. A. Digital Object Architecture
I am interested in whether the ontological requirements of physical objects 
can be exhibited in the architectural forms of digital objects? Through my inquiry 
of breves’ apparatus of simulation, as explicated, I will illustrate the boundaries it 
constructs as properties of digital objects. 
The issue  of  whether  or  not  contemporary  theory  can  produce  sensual 
boundaries  in  simulation  is  clouded  by  our  mainstream  understanding  of  the 
ontology of  digital  objects  and their  epistemological  frameworks in  which we 
come to understand them. Ontology is “the science or study of being; that branch 
 Dirk Helbing and Stefano Balietti. How To Do Agent-Based Simulations in the Future: From Modeling Social 180
Mechanisms to Emergent Phenomena and Interactive Systems Design (Santa Fe: Santa Fe Institute, 2011), 2.
 Klein and Spector, 3D Multi-Agent Simulations, 96. [11] Lassabe, [10] Kriplean, [6] Hamann, [42] Szymansko, 181
[43] Veeraswamy, [5] Don, [4] Cohen, [2] Bhalla.
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of metaphysics concerned with the nature or essence of being or existence.”  In 182
an effort to establish a more robust understanding of digital objects in this section, 
I will describe the composition and design of these objects.
“Object”  is  the  name  of  a  computational  data  in  object-oriented 
programming. Digital objects are vertices and attributes encapsulated within code 
and enframed in bounding boxes which enframe the digital object in a simulated 
environment. These digital objects are visual representations made via a process 
known as rasterization. Through the description of these objects, I consider the 
ontological assumptions of these descriptions. I employ a demonstration of joint 
construction as a means of exploring the basic cube and its functional relations to 
other objects within the simulation in order to offer a functional understanding of 
the digital object at hand. 
The  ontological  distinctions  of  single  predicates  (statements  about  the 
subject)  are  “countability,  temporal  stability,  and  ontological  rigidity.”  A 183
predicate is countable if “whenever it holds for an object x, it does not hold for a 
connected part of x”; temporally stable if what holds for an object at time1 holds 
at  time2;  and  ontologically  rigid  if  what  is  predicated  holds  in  any  possible 
worlds.  I apply three requirements as described by computer scientist Nicola 184
 "ontology, n.,” OED Online. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/131551?redirectedFrom=ontology+ (Accessed 182
February 18, 2016).
 Guarino, Formal Ontology, 635.183
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Guarino  (1995),  who focuses on knowledge modeling methodologies,  to the 185
object  as  demonstrated  in  breve  to  understand  the  ontological  assumptions 
ascribed  to  the  object.  The  tensions  and  polarizations  that  arise  from  this 
investigation will be addressed throughout this introduction to digital objects and 
to the case studies following.
The  description  of  digital  space  within  the  simulation  is  defined  as 
coordinates  and frames.  Object  frames  are  a  literal  example  of  the  boundary-
producing practice of the simulation apparatus. Objects are placed in object frame 
coordinates, and these frames operate within a world coordinate frame system.  186
There is also the eye frame, or clip coordinate, which is aligned for an observer 
through the screen to look down the z-axis into the world frame. When an object 
is moved, what is being rotated is the framing of the object, and not the object’s 
vertices.  All  vertices  of  the object  are housed within subject  frames,  which is 
called the bounding box.  187
“Objects” is also the name of the top level of computational code in breve. 
These objects are constructed through a hierarchy; at the top level, objects are 
either real in that they are coordinated with a physical entity in the simulated 
world, or abstract and used to control objects. Object attributes are data elements 
and  methods  are  program  elements,  and  both  are  encapsulated  in  an  object. 
Methods as program elements, “provide[] the only interfaces between the object 
 Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies.185
 Steven J. Gortler, Foundations of 3D Computer Graphics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 35. 186
 Gortler, Foundations of 3D Computer Graphics, 41. 187
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and other  parts  of  the  program.”  A class  is  similar  to  a  template  of  object 188
construction, participates in inheritances and hierarchy, each “class with it own 
methods.”  Objects  have  an  age,  a  type,  and  can  announce  and  observe 189
notifications.  Class  methods  provide  descriptions  of  controls,  including  the 
position and rotation of objects. 
Digital bodies are vertices and attributes; this is an ontologically stable or 
rigid quality of digital objects in the environment. As a component requirement of 
ontological distinctions, all digital objects in any possible world will be made of 
vertices. Vertices are the “junction of two or more lines in a network or graph.”  190
These vertices are the limits of the object. The vertex of each triangle makes up a 
geometric  3D  image.  3D  graphics  are  a  constellation  of  coordinates  whose 
vertices  are  associated  with  a  numerical  data  called  an  “attribute”—attributes 
assign properties. This attribute determines the appearance for the vertices; for 
example,  what  the  colour  is,  or  what  defines  reflection.  These  vertices  are 191
assembled by x, y, and z coordinates. Rasterization is a compression process that 
is comparable to materialization in matter, wherein the pixel-by-pixel expression 
of a form is rasterized. During rasterization, processed vertices are drawn on the 
 Donald M. McLver, "Object-Oriented Languages." Encyclopedia.com. Computer Sciences. 2002. http://188
www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3401200244.html (Accessed March 23, 2016).
 Donald M. McLver, Encyclopedia.com. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3401200244.html (Accessed 189
March 23, 2016).
 "vertice, n.". OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/203876?190
rskey=Kg6qT0&result=1 (Accessed February 18, 2016).
 Gortler, Foundations of 3D Computer Graphics, 5. 191
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screen via an assembler.  This process interpolates—or blends—the value of the 192
three vertices  in  order  to  apply attributes  to  the area within the triangle.  This 
process will be discussed extensively in the next section, which focuses on the 
notion of sensual boundaries as developed by rasterization. 
I would argue that many of the apparent qualities of digital objects are not 
considered  a  property  of  the  object.  For  example,  the  data  value  for  some 
geometric properties can be stored in the scene and not on or in the object itself. 
Light and reflection, for example, alter the appearance of the graphic, however; 
the data is not stored within the object itself. Texture is mapped onto an object.  193
Data that is not stored in the object can be constructed and assumed. This process 
provides visual complexity and it is used to smooth the triangular vectors. On the 
basis of this evidence, there is support for a way in which an apparatus divides the 
object from the environment. 
In  the  present  section,  the  issue  under  scrutiny  is  to  consider  which 
qualities of digital objects are the definitions of such an object. As a component 
requirement of ontological distinctions, I provide an example of countability: joint 
types  indicate  what  type  of  object  is  divisible  and  in  what  ways  it  can  be 
considered multiple,  or countable.  These functional joints illustrate how multi-
bodies are formed, and subsequently how they can be torn apart. 
 Gortler, Foundations of 3D Computer Graphics, 6. 192
 Gortler, Foundations of 3D Computer Graphics, 7. 193
 66
To demonstrate  how objects  connect  to  other  objects,  I  will  employ  a 
demonstration  that  illustrates  how  “joint  types”  are  constructed  to  provide  a 
clearer picture of how multi-cuboid-bodies are formed. The simulation opens with 
two red cubes framed tightly within a wire frame masking with the y and x axes 
labelled. The cubes hover and cast a shadow upon a pink-chequered ground. “Use 
the simulation menu to select a joint type” is written across the bottom of the 
screen.  The  simulation  menu  lists  five  joint  types:  fixed,  prismatic,  revolute, 
universal,  and ball.  The type on the screen changes with each selected option. 
“Fixedjoints do not move,” “PrismaticJoints slide along one axis”; the two red 
cubes are now animated, with the lower rising to fit like a piston within the top 
cube,  and  then  falling  to  completely  remove  and  disconnect.  “RevoluteJoints 
rotate  around  one  axis”;  the  bottom red  cube  lifts,  tracing  an  invisible  circle 
around and through the top cube, and at some point the cubes fit and transfer 
through one another seamlessly. “UniversalJoints rotate on two axes” illustrating 
the bottom cube cutting though the top with a range of motion, limited to one or 
another circular path. “BallJoints rotate on all axes”; the bottom cube spins below 
as if affixed by a spherical ball. These five joints are the manner in which multi-
bodies can be constructed. The cubes, through user input, can be separated and the 
fragmentation of the graphical event occurs. Knocked off the joint, the program 
prints an error report and the illustration turns grey.
For  the  temporal  stability  component  of  the  ontological  requirements, 
users  require  a  working conceptualization of  the space in  which these objects 
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experience time steps. Many of the demonstrations in breve have formulated time 
measures,  both in the constant  redrawing of the code,  and in the evolutionary 
processes of the program. The graphical event of a digital object is a constellation 
of coordinates, and this constellation of coordinates exhibits temporal stability. 
The modeling environment provides a world frame, allowing for coordinates and 
depth,  while  the  digital  object  is  localized  in  a  fixed  space.  In  this  way,  the 
simulation environment is itself a digital object, with its internal space defined by 
vertices. Digital objects’ “substance” of extension in space is one and the same. 
What  the  digital  object  is  made  of  and  the  environment  it  exists  in  are  not 
differentiated by kind. I am arguing that the digital object and the environment 
appears  to  be  a  unity,  in  that  the  digital  objects’ vertex  definition  necessarily 
requires the environment to be tangible and to appear as other.
The polarization of real and sensual qualities in physical objects is also in 
digital objects, expounded by the definition of data through the graphic event and 
in code. Code is a system of rules that expresses and instructs computers and is 
the  method  by  which  all  processing,  display,  and  transmission  of  information 
occurs.  N. Katherine Hayles (2010) unpacks the performativity of code, saying:194
Code running in a digital computer causes changes in machine behaviour 
and,  through  networked  ports  and  other  interfaces,  may  initiate  other 
changes,  all  implemented  through  transmission  and  execution  of  code. 
Although code originates with human writers and readers, once entered 
into the machine it has as its primary reader the machine itself.195
 "code, n.1". OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/35578?194
rskey=JOAoiT&result=1 (Accessed February 18, 2016).
 N. Katherine Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer : Digital Subjects and Literary Texts (Chicago, IL, USA: 195
University of Chicago Press, 2010) (Accessed March 23, 2016) ProQuest ebrary. 50.
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Alexander Galloway (2004) reiterates: 
code draws a line between what is material and what is active, in essence 
saying  that  writing  (hardware)  can  not  do  anything,  but  must  be 
transformed  into  code  (software)  to  be  effective…code  is  the  only 
language that is executable. [sic]196
 It is paramount to note that the environment in which these digital objects 
operate  and  engage  in  is  a  rule-based  environment,  and  as  such,  they  are 
monitored by governing standards and code.  These digital  objects  are situated 
objects, which is “the view that every course of action depends in essential ways 
on its  material  and social  circumstances.”  Galloway  defines  protocol  as  the 197
principle  of  the  distributed  management  of  networks,  outlining  rules  and 
standards,  and  thus,  code  unpacks  the  ways  information  is  partitioned  and 
shared.  “These regulations always operate at the level of coding—they encode 198
packets  of  information  so  they  may  be  transported  .  .  .  they  encapsulate 
information  inside  a  technically  defined  wrapper,  while  remaining  relatively 
indifferent to the content of the information contained within.”  Code is machine 199
behaviour,  transforming  objects  in  the  rule  based  environment;  the  object  is 
encoded yet remains relativity indifferent from the environment it was constructed 
from. 
 Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 196
2004), 165.
 Suchman, Human-Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions, 70.197
 Galloway, Protocol, 7.198
 Galloway, Protocol, 8.199
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The consequence—given the evolution, multiplication, and encapsulation 
of code—makes it so that its source (the computational origin) is untraceable and 
unrecoverable. The object-oriented principles of programming clarify what it is 
for a computational object to be encapsulated. A computation object is a series of 
actions and descriptions that are encapsulated. Encapsulation in programming, is 
the language construct that facilitates the bundling of data and attributes with the 
methods operating on that data. A digital object that is encapsulated can be said to 
be bimodal—that is, to have both have an exteriority and operate via an internal 
principle  logic.  Encapsulation  is  interesting  in  its  resemblance  to  Matryoshka 
dolls—there  are  parent  classes,  and  child  class,  nesting  within  one  another. 
Classes are constructed of methods and variables, these are developed by creating 
subclasses of parent classes. Some classes of breve include, but are not limited to: 
joint types, shape and custom shape, floor, mobile, multi body, real (interestingly 
enough, “a class which is never instantiated.”)  User programmers can alter or 200
construct from empty classes, yet the software parent class list is expansive.
 Galloway defines objects as “inheritable, extendible, procreative. Objects 
are  not  archived,  they  are  autosaved.  Objects  are  not  read,  they  are  scanned, 
parsed, concatenated, and split.”   These digital objects produced by code are 201
objects of computer language; they are self-contained or encapsulated units  of 
properties,  tasks,  actions,  etc.  All  actions  and  processes  in  object-oriented 
 “The Breve Simulation Environment Documentation | Breve.” 2015. Accessed May 7. http://200
www.spiderland.org/breve/documentation.php.
 Galloway, Protocol, 74.201
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programs are encapsulated as interiors. Given that the apparatuses always produce 
the  subject,  interiority,  and alterity,  this  investigation asks  in  what  manner  do 
digital objects possess an interiority? By identifying the process of encapsulation 
as  an  internalizing  action,  processes  of  the  digital  object  necessitates  the 
interiority of a computational object.
I  have  described  an  apparatus  according  to  Barad’s  definition  of  the 
apparatus as it defines/marks boundaries of the digital objects. These are outlined 
using the illustration of the digital object’s ontological qualities as they are present 
in breve.  This apparatus,  I  want to suggest  is  dependent on the observer as it 
provides  access  to  the  construction  of  the  computational  object  in  terms  of 
language, and access in terms of language. Our access to digital objects beyond 
phenomenal and sensory access, is through language and code, and as such, there 
is  a  limit  to  what  types  of  observers  have  access  to  the  objects  that  I  am 
discussing. Interestingly, this restriction doesn’t pertain to the ability of digital 
objects  themselves  being  able  to  participate  in  communicative  states  through 
announcement and subscription. 
Digital bodies are vertices and attributes that have a rigid or ontologically 
stable quality, as do the framing devices assembled in the simulated space. These 
framing devices are spelled out in clearer detail in the forthcoming section, “The 
Apparatus of Touch.” Digital objects’ countability was discussed in terms of the 
linking force of joints, demonstrating that what can be fragmented from an object 
is not considered the object in itself, but rather, as something countable and other.
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VI. Sensual Facets 
This  thesis  endeavours  to  describe  ways  in  which  agential  separability 
performs and marks sensual boundaries upon and within digital objects that in 
turn, allow for intra-activity of sensual phenomena as exteriority. Here, I argue for 
the construction of sensual boundaries of digital objects through the discursive 
practice of rasterization. The lens I apply is Karen Barad’s agential separability, 
which offers a tangential cut to separate subject and object, interior from exterior. 
Agential  separability  is  a  performative  mode  that  renders  “exteriority  with-in 
phenomena.”  This performance as agency is not an attribute or a property of the 202
exteriority;  rather,  the  performative  cut  itself  is  agentive.  The  apparatus  of 
simulation  provides  the  potential  for  marking  boundaries  allowing  for  intra-
activity. 
 I will argue that rasterization is an agency, and that it is a knowing process 
that enacts meaning through phenomenal reconfiguration of virtual matter—again, 
where  “‘phenomena’  are  the  ontologically  inseparability  of  objects  and 
apparatuses.  [sic]”  This  is  a  sensual  analysis,  within which the presence or 203
exteriority of the phenomenal cut or boundary is explored—where we recognize 
the  exterior  of  a  digital  object.  I  interrogate  the  manner  in  which  objective 
phenomenal cuts can be said to represent a sensual body, or more specifically, the 
way that normals intervene with the computational object to provide an exteriority 
 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 140.202
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 72
considered as  skin.  “Two cardinal  tenets  of  empiricism remained unassailable, 
however, and so remain to this day. One is that whatever evidence there is for 
science is sensory evidence.”  The second is that the “meaning of words must 204
rest ultimately on sensory evidence.”205
Rasterization  is  the  process  that  converts  an  algebraic  formula  into  a 
computer-generated  image,  pixel-by-pixel,  unto  a  screen.  Barad’s  phenomenal 
cuts as means of materialization is mirrored in the process of rasterization. The 
phenomenal  cuts  that  occur  during  the  procedure  of  rasterization  are  events 
mirrored  by  agential  separability.  Rasterization  separates  the  object  from  the 
subject, and in its agential separability it can be said to performs as a boundary-
making apparatus. Rasterization converts a computational equation into a set of 
points or pixels on screen.  I’ll argue how meaning is constructed on the virtual 206
screen, asking the question: in what ways can the objective phenomenal cut be 
said to represent a body—a sensual body?
Current  research  by  new  media  artist  Vibeke  Sorenson  and  social 207
architect  Mark Beam  seems to validate  the view that  digital  objects  can be 208
outfitted with a host of sensible properties and experiences; to this end, a host of 
anthropomorphized  sensibilities  can  be  assumed.  Sorensen  and  Beam  (2001) 
 Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, 530.204
 Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, 530.205
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compile hardware developed as technological  extensions of human senses,  but 
senses are not the only requirement for sensuality or sensual objects. These object 
descriptions include the sensible outfitting or hybrid physical-digital interfaces, 
which lead to proposed sensibilities.
Sensible objectness is it  not what potential sensibilities an object could 
experience; rather, what this section aims to discuss is which sensual boundaries 
are observed, and in what manner is that phenomenon a sensibility. The boundary 
of a sensual object is a product of the apparatus, and boundaries indicate the point 
between presence (presentation) and apprehension (preceptive understanding), as 
well as between the real qualities and the sensual qualities of sensual objects. The 
phenomenon described is a distinct process of boundary production that separates 
a digital object from its environment. The other method of boundary production in 
terms  of  separating  digital  objects  from  their  environment  is  encapsulation, 
discussed more shortly. For now, I limit the scope of this discussion to the specific 
phenomenal production of rasterization. 
The  digital  phenomena  I  am talking  about  are  a  direct  product  of  the 
rasterization  process;  we  are  discussing  digital  objects’ exteriority.  Its  skin—
which comprises a textural pattern or colour that is draped over the digital objects’ 
vertices—allows  for  volume  and  form  and  is  in  some  manner,  opaque.  This 
phenomenon of form, volume, and colour are pragmatically reliant on a human 
observer, yet the sensual objects of presence have both real and sensual qualities
—real  qualities  that  retreat  from  apprehension  and  exist  autonomously. 
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Phenomena is said by representationalists to be a property that is separate from 
the thing observed; rather, it is considered a sensation within the observer. On this 
account, the apparatus—here, the rasterization process—becomes the observation 
or observer that marks (causes) phenomenal expression. Through the empiricist 
tradition, the objects’ sensual properties conclude that the sensing property is a 
product solely of the observer. 
We will  be  operating  with  a  different  version  of  phenomena,  one  that 
addresses phenomenal materialization through Barad, and the objectivity of this 
phenomenon through Harman. A phenomenon is what separates an object from its 
real and sensual qualities, as described in Harman (2010). Harman puts forward 
the view that sensual objects are not entirely reliant on an observer; in fact, they 
are independent with both real and sensual qualities. The phenomenal experience 
then  is  not  wholly  human,  but  rather  an  expression  of  objects  whose  causal 
impression is not unilateral.
To portray the issue in Karen Barad’s terms, “phenomena do not merely 
mark the epistemological inseparability of observe and observed, or the results of 
measurements;  rather,  phenomena  are  the  ontologically  inseparability/
entanglement of intra-acting ‘agencies.’”  The issue is not simply to note the 209
requirement  of  an  observer,  but  to  say  that  in  simulation  there  is  a  unique 
observer, being that the domain is itself embedded with intelligence and agencies. 
Further, these simulation environments were designed to model the rationality of 
  Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 139.209
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humans. The separations that are pronounced through phenomenal cuts are further 
made  boundaryless  when  we  consider  the  acts  of  rasterization  as  defining  a 
boundary that is itself reliant on the material configurations of the screen. 
The definition and precision that is accounted for operate in two realms, 
both on screen and in virtual space. One consideration is the material limitation of 
pixels, and inherent to these limitations is the indivisibility of the square light. In 
virtual  space  we  have  easy  access  to  scale  manipulability;  when  an  image  is 
zoomed in or enlarged it is clear that the division of the rasterization process is not 
clear-cut  in  a  throughly  penetrative  and  definite  way,  as  the  boundaries  are 
blurred.  There are washes of objects sharing boundaries. In a different domain, 
off  the  screen  yet  still  pertaining  to  the  virtuality,  visualization  becomes  a 
relational notion that infinite magnification that can occur with lines. 
Each point is a point in between and in a long succession of other points. 
The serial nature of points is described by art historian George Kubler (1962). 
Kubler describes at length open-ended sequences and closed series; a closed series 
is a duration with a finite number of possible positions it has within each position. 
Consider here that each position is a pixel, and each has a limited potential to 
commit in correspondence when taking the said position. Once committed, the 
potentiality  ceases  to  be  limiting  to  other  potential  possible  positions.  It  is 210
 George Kubler, “Serial Position, Age, and Change,” in The Shape of Time (New Haven: Yale University 210
Press, 1962), 54 
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important and not redundant to say that the taking of one’s position in a series 
“limits the succeeding innovations.”211
The  simple  task  of  enlarging  a  low-resolution  image  indicates  what 
happens to  boundaries  as  the scalability  changes:  the crisp boundary becomes 
jagged, blurred, and broken. The question of the role of the domain is apparent in 
these  two  analogies.  The  scope  of  the  domain  changes  drastically  after  the 
phenomenal cut, and it changes the apparatus of measurement. 
Normals is a mathematical calculation that allows one to gain the gradient 
of the curve. On the screen, the first methods of visualization are the boundary 
formation of the “normals” skin on the digital object. In many graphic editors—
for example, Photoshop—“normals” is a filter function to see the gradient and 
curves  of  a  3D object.  The lines  drawn through the  normals  function are  the 
vertices of the graphical digital object. The “normals” filter is the skin. Digital 
skin is the computational descriptions intercepted by the limitations of the objects’ 
vertices—upon which the  primary property,  being the  boundary of  the  object, 
textures can be applied. These textures that are applied—and further at its root, 
normals  (even  though  they  are  a  mathematical  equation)—are  a  phenomenal 
quality of digital objects. If it is phenomenal, it is sensible.
 I  am  not  attempting  to  describe  digital  objects  as  material,  but  it’s 
important to reiterate that they are models of physical materiality that operate with 
many  similar  descriptions  as  their  target  source.  It  is  important  to  note—as 
 Kubler, Serial Position, Age, and Change, 54. 211
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previously discussed in both the modeling of digital objects, and the means of 
representation—that  some  of  the  ontological  object-ness  of  materiality  is 
necessarily modeled into the simulation.
What I argue to be modeled are the phenomenal qualities; in turn, these 
can be quantifiably measured and duplicated in breve’s simulation environment. 
The case of this thesis is not to argue for the reality of digital objects, in neither 
their objectivity nor their supposed substantivity, but rather for the transference of 
materiality by way of the apparatus, which is used to define and build objects and 
environments in hand. 
 The idea of discursive practice will be elaborated on further in the next 
part,  but  here  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  methods  in  which  the  objects 
themselves are constructed is through definition. As I described in the previous 
section,  digital  objects  are objects  of  definition.  Here,  we are discussing ways 
these objects are visible, and we unpack what process made them visible. It is not 
to discuss the miraculous lens of the eye, but rather, something other has made 
these  objects  demonstrate  exteriority.  The  objects  that  are  being  modeled  are 
being modeled in such a way that their visibility is necessary so, by the apparatus 
that is chosen to measure them. 
VI. A. Discursive Practice of Rasterization
If rasterization is considered a discursive practice, then how does it model 
the  intra-actions  of  agential  separability?  On  the  basis  of  this  analysis,  the 
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simulation frame hosting the body is a discursive practice. The discursive practice 
of  the  frame  is  performative.  In  addition,  the  virtual  environment  and  its 
transposition into a visual landscape hosts an interesting eye frame apparatus. The 
role  of  camera  projection  coordinates  (user  screen  perspective)  simulates  the 
gaze’s capacity to apply cuts.  The clip coordinates of the rasterization process 
probes the exterior veil of the digital object, and the object coordinates are turned 
into eye coordinates.  The camera projection matrix gets the clip coordinates and 212
these  clip  coordinates  determine  how  the  image  is  presented  on  the  screen, 
including its colour and distance from the screen.  It is the case that although the 213
object in virtuality exists in a 3D space, each item needs to be transposed upon the 
screen,  “pixel  by  pixel.”  The  frame  as  a  discursive  practice  is  a  “specific 214
material  (re)configuring  of  the  world  through  which  the  determination  of 
boundaries,  properties,  and  meanings  is  differentially  enacted.”  Points  are 215
places that are described by the frame. Vectors are motions that move the frame 
within  a  master  frame system.  The movement  is  a  performance of  the  digital 
object.
The  boundary  is  defined,  such  that  the  precipice  of  truth  and 
representation, as well as that of space and movement, is described in the vector 
motions and coordinates of the digital object’s exteriority. Barad argues, “matter 
 Gortler, Foundations of 3D Computer Graphics, 51. 212
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does not refer to a fixed substance; rather, matter is substance in its intra-active 
becoming—not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency. Matter is stabilizing 
and destabilizing process of iterative intra-activity.”  The doing in the case of 216
breve is a constant running of the simulation program, whereas the vector and the 
visualization of it are being written throughout the rasterization process. Although 
this rasterization appears seamless, it is a process and not static. 
The  way  Harman  sets  up  his  phenomenal  tension  also  supports  the 
transference  of  digital  objects  ontological  structures  without  relying  on 
intentionality.  That  is  to  say,  the  phenomenal  tensions  are  the  intra-actions  of 
mattering. The sensual and real qualities are not bundled or encapsulated into one 
object; rather, they are extended in a multi-relational suspension allowing for a 
variety  of  sensual  or  phenomenal  understandings  on  the  object—objects  are 
multiple. The phenomenal cut can be necessarily reproduced given the use of the 
apparatus. The separation of the digital object from its digital environment sets up 
a way to illustrate the discursive practice of cutting and defining boundaries in 
these objects as they are rasterized.
Mattering, according to Barad, is a doing. A common idea of matter is to 
consider  matter  as  a  particle  whose key attributes  are extension and passively 
awaiting form. This atomistic view is mirrored in the virtual space, for example in 
breve, with each point or pixel being localized and awaiting word from a causal 
force. Barad’s agential separation expands the notion of matter as a process of 
 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 151.216
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intra-active becoming. It is in this way that mattering is a doing—it is not a fixed 
substance:  “Matter(ing)  is  a  dynamic  articulation/configuration  of  the  world. 
[sic]”217
Agency is prominent in the literature on phenomenal mattering. According 
to  Barad,  agency  is  the  “ongoing  dynamics  of  intra-activity.”   On  these 218
grounds,  I  argue  for  the  performance  of  digital  objects  and  their  cuts  of 
rasterization as apparatuses of discursive practice. This rasterization exemplifies 
the individuation of phenomenal cuts; it is a means of choosing one line of the 
apparatus in which to cut through the simulation, allowing slices of insight into 
the ontology of a digital object. The cuts that occur with this process provide an 
unrivalled exteriority.
Barad describes “according to Foucault, discursive practices are the local 
sociohistorical  material  conditions  that  enable  and  constrain  disciplinary 
knowledge practices such as speaking, writing, thinking, calculation, measuring, 
filtering,  and  concentrating.”  Rasterization  exemplifies  the  apparatus  as  a 219
boundary-making practice—it marks the digital body by ascribing properties and 
meanings  by  differentiating  the  digital  object  from  its  environment.  “In  an 
agential realist account, discursive practices are specific material (re)configurings 
of  the  world  through  which  the  determination  of  boundaries,  properties,  and 
 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 151.217
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meanings is differentially enacted. [sic]”  Rasterization then is agentive; it is a 220
knowing  process  that  enacts  meaning  for  the  object  through  phenomenal 
reconfiguration.  Rasterization  is  a  process  that  specifically  articulates 
differentiation;  it  is  “a  generative  factor  in  the  formation of  bodies.”  Barad 221
reframes causality by defining “discursive practice[s] [as] causal intra-actions”—
they enact causal structures through which some components (the “effects”) of the 
phenomenon are marked by other components (the “causes”) in their differential 
articulation.222
In  what  ways  is  rasterization  a  means  of  mattering?  Rasterization  is  a 
process  of  mattering;  it  is  the  agential  cut  that  renders  virtual  space  with  an 
exteriority  that  presents  like  a  face.  This  analysis  posits  that  a  multiplicity  of 
sensations occurs between and within a single or multiple-bodied system through 
the sensual object of exteriority. These digital objects perform toward experienced 
individuation from a coalescent  environmental  body,  and/or  from other  digital 
bodies.
VI. B. Object as Face
In understanding the object as face, I look to the sensual boundaries that 
are  developed  through  rasterization  and  consider  the  manner  in  which  this 
exteriority can be considered a face. These sensual boundaries are products of the 
 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 148.220
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rasterization apparatus. Here, the apparatus defines the exteriority and leads one 
then to inquire into the nature of its interiority. Typically, objects are considered to 
have both interiority and exteriority. The manner in which a digital object is said 
to have an interiority will be explored further in these case studies. I provide an 
analysis  of  digital  objects-as-face  and  object-as-other.  The  graphic  event  of 
individuation as indicative of an interiority, yet, the interiority of a digital object is 
not available in its representation, that is to say—not available via the screen. I 
would suggest that the visual face is indicative of interiority and allows for its 
individuation. The way this contributes to the sensual analysis, relates to the way 
the phenomenal exteriority is necessarily stranger to others and by encapsulation 
stranger within its environment. In object-as-other, I explore touch as a means of 
individuation as it  is exemplified in collision and neighbour detection methods 
through the Swarm demonstration. Touch is considered sensual in practical ways. 
I establish how individuation occurs outside of sensual visualization by clarifying 
the process of encapsulation to arrive at the place where computational objects 
dwell.
The sensual boundary, considered a “face,” engages the user to consider 
responsibility towards digital objects. Philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas, in Totality 
and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority  (1961), indicates ways in which the face 
provokes  responsibility.  In  this  manner,  the  face  confronts.  Confrontation  is  a 
mode of engagement that the face participates in. Confrontation is also the term 
Harman  uses  to  describe  the  relationship  an  object  has  with  other  objects. 
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Confrontation is a way to illicit movement for sensual qualities. It can then be said 
that the sensual boundary of a face elicits both notions of interiority and ethical 
responsibility or its confrontational mode of engagement. 
VI. B. 1. Exteriority of Sensual Facets 
In this paper, I have addressed rasterization in terms of introducing the 
bounding box as being the frame that is presented to the screen. The skin of the 
object is spoken about in terms of its normals, meaning the intersecting vertices 
and subsequent to rasterization,  its  opacity which is  its  exteriority.  The digital 
object—that is, any sensual object that expresses digital vertices—has a rasterized 
face. The face is both the “principle feature in recognition” and the “bounding 
planes of a regular geometric solid.”  A face is an exteriority that insinuates an 223
interiority, due both to its potentiality and its responsibility. The face indicates that 
there is something behind. The aim of this section is to explore the interiority that 
is provided by the notion of the face.  Alterity provides a face—a face that meets 
other faces.  Lévinas discusses the nakedness of the face, illustrating that it  is 
beyond one’s eyes and perceptions. The face “is by itself and not by reference to a 
system.”  The  alterity  or  otherness  of  the  face  is  exaggerated  in  its  nudity. 224
Lévinas  introduces  “the  relation  with  the  face  is  not  an  object-cognition.  The 
transcendence of the face is at the same time its absence from this world into 
 "face, n.,” OED Online, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67425?rskey=jm0PDn&result=1 (Accessed February 223
18, 2016).
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which  it  enters,  the  exiling  [dépaysement]  of  a  being,  his  condition  of  being 
stranger,  destitute,  or  proletarian.”  Here,  the  focus  is  that  the  exteriority  is 225
pronounced by the otherness in its condition of being a stranger; the face requires 
an  other  to  confront.  There  is  a  realm of  responsibility  that  is  birthed in  this 
theory. In this section, I ask: what is the sensual object of exteriority?
A keen  difference  between  the  apparatus  cut  in  matter  and  the  cut  in 
simulated  matter  is  the  multiplicity  of  the  intra-actions  available  within  the 
simulation. It would seem that the specificity of the rasterization task—although 
complacent  in  its  own historicity—is  less  complex.  The  cut,  however,  is  still 
sensual in its capacity to mark bodies, and as such, is ontic—recalling the sensual 
object  has  both  sensual  and  real  qualities.  The  cut  produced  penetrates  the 
simulation but not the graphical event, for what is revealed to this sensual analysis 
is that rasterization operates at a level of phenomenon that excludes interiority. 
The  interior  of  the  cube  is  not  rendered  visible;  only  interceptions  veiled  in 
sensual  texture  are  visible  as  such;  the  inexhaustibility  of  computational 
description is not visible. The boundaries of the digital objects exterior vertices 
that are produced are not transparent, nor is its skin.  Nevertheless, the boundary, 
which is indicated by its skin has sensuality. I maintain that the texture skin or 
colour  red  has  the  same  sensual  foothold,  although  potentially  more  nuanced 
given the restrictive conditions in simulation—a red cut is still red.
 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 75.225
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The sensual object’s real qualities of interiority are hidden. It is awkward 
to talk about ways in which the interiority of an object is not available in the 
representation of the object. Both Harman and Barad would say, in different ways, 
that the phenomenon or sensual object of the object is the object. Harms sensual 
object  and  Barad’s  phenomenon  in  exteriority  are  the  base  of  my  sensual 
description.  The act  of  searching for  an interiority  is  a  product  of  the  human 
cognizer’s subject/object dualism, a remnant of Descartes.
Can the tensions between real and sensual qualities be exhibited in the 
confrontation of a face? The face is a mode of confrontation. Harman suggest that 
confrontation “turns the unspoken duel of sensual object and quality found in time 
into an open dispute between its two constituents.”  Where some objects require 226
the  recognition  of  one  another,  others  merely  need  an  exteriority  to  maintain 
alterity. Confrontation that requires recognition is an intentionality. Digital objects 
participate  in  “interiority”  yet  continue  to  inherit,  collide,  and  mediate  with 
situated others, thereby building an in-between alterity.
VI. B. 2. Intentional Descriptions
Is  the  apparatus  inexhaustible  in  its  penetration?  Interiority  is  the 
intentionality of an object. Computation objects are objects of thought that have 
been filled with content—that  is,  descriptions and actions by programmers.  In 
breve, users are the programmers. The intention of an object is the meaning or 
 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 126.226
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content  of  an  object.  Here,  intentionality  is  considered  to  be  epistemically 
available because of  encapsulation.  Encapsulation is  the coded composition of 
computational attributes and methods that make up the computational object.
The descriptions of objects are encoded on the inside, whereas phenomenal theory 
speaks of descriptions being encrusted upon the outside of an object. 
First, there is no access to the object’s interiority by way of the screen. The 
screen  does  not  offer  access  to  the  interiority  of  an  object.  As  mentioned 
previously, the exteriority of the digital vertices are inexhaustible, and as such, so 
is skin, which is why we cannot touch the body. Harman argues that only the 
intellect  can  access  particular  kinds  of  objects,  namely  those  considered  real. 
Objects considered to be real are those that hide or retreat from the sensual object-
ness, and as such make no presentation and lack exteriority. In a similar manner, 
the way in which a human cognizer understands objects through intentionality is 
mapped upon the way computational objects witness their own intentionality and 
the  intentionality  of  other  computational  objects.  Where  observation  may  be 
required  to  discuss  the  interiority  of  the  object,  I  would  suggest  it  is  not  a 
requirement of that observer to be a human cognizer.
The face that appears is not different from the environment in most ways, 
as it is still an image on the screen. Further differentiation is articulated by other 
phenomena,  such  as  collision  because  it  activates  a  method  for  response. 
Rasterization, as an apparatus lacks interiority, this is indicative of the product of 
an apparatus’ function. It is anthropocentric that I yearn for organs and bone and 
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in  virtual  environments  similarly  like  breve,  users  yearn  for  the  interiority  of 
digital objects. Yet, the opaque intra-actions of rasterization is a function of the 
penetrative and encompassing force of that description.
Lévinas  has  suggested  that  alterity  requires  an  absolute  other;  I  would 
suggest  that  individuation  in  virtual  environments  occurs  from  within,  not 
without.  Lévinas  motivates  “to  have  meaning  is  to  be  situated  relative  to  an 
absolute,  that  is,  to  come  from that  alterity  that  is  not  absorbed  in  its  being 
perceived.”   The aim of simulation, is to assume a position of control in the 227
environment, yet this virtual environment cannot be considered absolute as its’ 
domain is  naturally restricted by autopoiesis.  Again,  this  speaks of the other’s 
capacity not to be neutralized by possession. Providing the object is not made 
property  by  other  objects,  the  alterity  of  the  computational  object  persists  in 
differentiation from its environment and other rasterized objects persist.
 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 97.227
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VII. Sensual Alterity 
VII. A. Object as Other
In  object-as-other,  the  intra-action  that  is  discussed  is  the  boundary 
production  of  touch.  Users  touch  objects  in  their  construction  and  mutability 
through programming. Here, I discuss the ways that digital objects ‘touch’ others 
in  their  simulated  environments.  The  third  party  collision  handler  of  breve 
operates  as  the  apparatus  that  measures  the  embodied  object,  as  well  as 
differentiates  the  body  from  others  and  from  the  environment.  Through  the 
discussion of the touch apparatus, collision, and neighbour behaviours, sensual 
boundaries of the bounding box—sensational areas that frame the object’s vertices
—we see how the apparatus operates to enframe the digital object through touch 
or collision. This enframement is then discussed as a form of dwelling, a concept 
introduced in Lévinas’ alterity theory. Alterity is an internalizing principle that 
arises from the state of “being other or different; diversity, difference, otherness” 
are  examples  of  this  relational  position.  The  apparatus  internalizes  digital 228
objects through encapsulation. Encapsulation is the manner by which objects in 
object-oriented programming come to be operable as a unit or composite object. 
VII. A. 1. The Apparatus of Touch
Touch is understood through the tactility of experiencing rigid pressure, 
typically through materialism and extension.  I  ask in  what  ways can a  digital 
 "alterity, n.,” OED Online, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/5788?redirectedFrom=alterity+ (Accessed 228
February 18, 2016).
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objects  experience  touch?  In  object-as-other,  I  explore  touch  as  a  means  of 
individuation. Cultural theorist Erin Manning’s  “Engendering: Gender, Politics, 229
Individuation” in Politics of Touch: Sense, Movement, Sovereignty (2007) begins 
by describing the  way skin develops  and is  stimulated by the  environment  to 
produce, for humans, “the most alert of the organs.”  Touch in this expository is 230
considered an opportunity to move beyond “fixing bodies as simple objects of 
thought.”   Touch is  more  than things  being brought  into  contact  with  each 231
other; touch is “to leave its mark.”  I want to move beyond touch as being the 232
point  of  recognition  for  the  causal  chain,  and  consider  how  touch  imparts 
participation in self-individuation.
In  this  present  section,  the  issue  under  analysis  is  how  objects  can 
experience  touch and therefore  experience  an  other  or  the  relation  of  alterity. 
Barad unpacked ways that touch identifies an otherness: “so much happens in a 
touch:  an  infinity  of  others—other  beings,  other  spaces,  other  times—are 
aroused.”233
Collision  is  the  way  breve  touches,  and  a  closer  examination  on  the 
collision interaction follows. Collision occurs in two ways: when digital objects 
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 Erin Manning, “Engendering: Gender, Politics, Individuation,” in Politics of Touch: Sense, Movement, 230
Sovereignty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 110.
 Manning, Engendering, 110.231
 "touch, n.,” OED Online, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/203876?rskey=Kg6qT0&result=1 (Accessed 232
February 18, 2016).
 Karen Barad, "On Touching—The Inhuman That Therefore I Am,” in Differences: A Journal Of Feminist Cultural Studies 23, 233
no. 3 (Fall 2012): 206.
 90
collide  into  other  digital  objects,  and  when  objects  are  able  to  determine  the 
intersecting  objects,  be  it  themselves  or  others.  A digital  object  requires  the 
knowledge of collision when interacting with its body, as expounded here: “all 
touching  entails  an  infinite  alterity,  so  that  touching  the  Other  is  touching  all 
Others, including the ‘self,’ and touching the ‘self’ entails touching the strangers 
within.”  Applying  this  idea  of  self-touch,  digital  objects  require  collision 234
handlers to define the boundaries of their bodies. A collision handler is a third 
party  that  indicates  the  moment  a  boundary  has  been  breached.  Touch  is 
exemplified in breve through collision and neighbour detection methods.
The moment of individuation occurs at the moment of touch, and this is 
where  sensual  othering  occurs.  For  the  digital  object,  touch  is  a  unique 
phenomenon, and digital skin is different. The thing that is touched in simulation 
software  is  neither  skin  nor  a  body  proper;  rather,  it  is  a  bounding  box  that 
surrounds  a  digital  object.  The visualization of  the  digital  object  requires  this 
bounding box for its situatedness in the simulated environment, but it also is a 
method used to allow digital bodies to recognize the boundaries and limitation of 
their  body. The bounding box performs the task of skin,  and it  is  how digital 
objects come to recognize their body. 
Manning illustrates that “identity is exposed by individuation as a moment 
in a process that expands far beyond the bounds of a strict category one might call 
 Barad, On Touching, 214.234
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the ‘self.’”  This quote illustrates the way that the bounding box—in excess of 235
the  digital  body,  and  through  a  process  of  individuation,  or  touch—reveals 
through the collision handler the digital object as bounded, and it is qualitatively 
one.  Now,  I  hesitate  to  use  “self,”  and  I  have  argued  against  the  categorical 
oneness of substance, so to claim individuation from the perspective of the object 
is challenging. Touch in the digital environment doesn’t indicate one in composite 
wholeness; rather, it indicates one point or measurement of relation to the said 
point  within  the  digital  coordinates.  The  way  that  touch  individuates  is  by 
activating the collision handler, forcing the digital body to respond to touch. 
The  analysis  of  individuating  human bodies  and digital  bodies  is  non-
equivocal  in  a  multitude  of  ways;  namely,  the  individual  digital  body  is  pre-
organized,  pre-constituted,  and  pre-defined,  whereas  the  human  body  in  this 
analysis is considered “in-formation,” becoming and metamorphosing form and 
matter.  Yet,  “the  body  is  mechanic  in  the  sense  that  it  is  plural  and 236
unpredictable,  evoking  always  through  movements  that  are  contingent  on 
environment and (re)combinations.”  The body is described as “a network of 237
imminent  trajectories  with  longitudinal  and  latitudinal  lines  intersecting,”  an 
assemblage as described by the vectorization of the body. I want to motivate an 
understanding of the digital object as in-formation with the digital body.238
 Manning, Engendering, 115.235
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The  notion  that  an  architectural  building  is  a  host  for  a  body,  or  that 
architecture is a bounding box of a body, is interpreted by cultural theorist Mark 
Hanson  in Wearable Space (2003). This paper describes “wearable space” as a 239
balance  between  the  “affective  basis  for  interface”  and  correlated  sensory 
capacities, as the interface between humans and computing. Hanson’s main claim 
is  that  the  human  body  is  “a  source  for  and  activator  of  a  rich  affective 
constitution  of  space.”  Hanson  introduces  “landing  sites”  as  perceptual 240
situatedness; a requirement for being a subject is to participate in these relational 
claims, and a landing site allows one to say “here or there.”  Imaging landing 241
sites are not considered perceptual; rather, in “…imbuing [space] with a sensory 
richness  that  yields  bodily  meaning,”  they  are  active  and  allow  for  the 
“embodying  of  space.”  Hanson  mirrors  Barad’s  always  already  “agentive” 242
matter in identifying the world as “always already endowed with the ‘kinaesthetic 
context and feel of [the] sensoria’ of embodied perceivers. [18]”243
The origins of the architectural landing sites are instrumentally constructed 
from the performance of the body.  In breve, the architectural landing site is a 244
bounding box, and as such, is instrumentally created from the performance of the 
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digital  body.  Hanson  introduces  Peter  Eisenman ,  a  contemporary  figure  in 245
architecture  whose  struggle  with  embodied  constraints  in  architecture  are 
discussed in terms of interiority:  “For Eisenman, . . .  the crucial element of a 246
new conception of architecture’s interiority corresponds to a digitally facilitated 
metamorphosis of the diagram.”  247
The  metamorphose  of  the  transcended digital  diagram produces  a  new 
interiority based on the pushing and pulling of shape and volume as it is digitally 
inserted  into  the  architecture’s  interior.  This  dismisses  the  previous  claim  by 
Peirce  (1955)  that  in  architecture  the  sign  and  the  signifier  possess  a  real 
compositional coherency. This premise supports the claim that the digital diagram 
is  a  “vehicle  for  the  transformation  of  interiority  itself.”  The  diagram  is 248
motivated as an apparatus whose product is always a subject. In breve, the interior 
space  by  which  users  construct  is  a  ready-made,  though  the  environmental 
variables are open to alteration. Simulation environments at a carte blanche state 
allow for  dynamic  spatialization  as  environments  are  constructed  from empty 
classes. What follows from this discussion is a new configuration of space—or 
space as void—as a functional affect or property of the architectural space as not-
presence.  This new concept is  a digital  interiority.  “As a kind of recipe for 249
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reconfiguring architectural interiority, spacing functions precisely by soliciting an 
affective embodiment that exceeds the spatial bounds of the organic body.”  The 250
affect is that the digital body is in excess of itself. 
VII. A. 2. Bounding Box and Neighbour Response-Ability 
The  bounding  volume  is  a  geometric-shaped  frame  that  houses  an 
internalized digital object. This digital object does not parrot the bounding box’s 
shape; the landing site exceeds the digital body, and as such, there is excessive 
volume of actionable space in the bounding box where there is no digital object. 
This excessive volume is included in penetration monitoring. breve’s object-to-
object  interaction  or  reciprocal  action  is  limited;  objects  can  collide  with  one 
another—they can touch. They have neighbour detection methods that can find the 
closest  object within a preordained environment known as a “neighbourhood.” 
Other  interactions  involve  triggering  events  by  the  use  of  notifications  or 
announce methods, and they can search for a given type of object and respond to a 
method call.
 Touch is the monitored penetration of the body’s bounding box and its 
excess. This excess within the bounding box allows for some otherworldly causal 
and visual effects; namely, objects will be triggered in response when the object 
appears, as if no collision or touch has occurred. The digital objects will respond 
to a method call that will generate a response of rigidity and potential bounce, 
 Hansen, Wearable Space, 348. 250
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while simultaneously experiencing the boundary call. Manning demonstrates that 
“touch is performative in the sense that it exposes the challenges the excessive 
body (the body in excess of  its-self)  calls  forth within the domain of  cultural 
intelligibility.”  Manning describes a “force field” that through and at the act of 251
reaching towards engenders a force that alters space and time. Touch as a relation 
reaches towards not a situated body, but a body that becomes engendered by that 
touch. The point of contact, the mark, is what defines and causes the exteriority, 
and not the volume nor the space it occupies itself. Bodies are defined by their in-
forming boundaries. 
Collision modeling is the modeling of the rigidity of physical objects. It is 
the modeling of the causal chain that is prevalent in mechanistic world modeling. 
Digital objects experience rigidness in multiple ways; it is both written into their 
property  assessment,  and is  a  by-product  of  interacting with  the  environment. 
Rigidity is an operational definition for the ontological predication of an object. 
Rigidity is a quality of collision that is replicated by the drawing of boundary 
boxes. The way that rigidness is simulated in breve is  as a ready-made object 
quality.  Rigidness  then,  is  not  a  quality  of  substance;  it  is  a  boundary that  is 
developed through touch. One is individuated in as much as it has been touched. 
Collision modeling is an interesting form of knowledge production. On the 
one hand, collision is  the confrontation of others,  on the other,  it  is  a sensual 
coming to know. The way that collision is modeled in a simulated environment is 
 Manning, Engendering, 112. 251
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prolonged from the manner collision occurs in the physical world, and collision 
here requires a third party. The digital object responds to collision information 
through a collision handler. The collision handler puts forth the appropriate action 
and a preordained trigger behaviour in response; namely, retreat or progress—
cowardice  or  aggression.  The  manner  in  which  collision  and  confrontation  is 
treated  requires  a  moment  that  causal  qualities  appear  to  transverse  their 
commonsensical notions of causality, where action appears to flow backwards in 
time. This becoming is the notion that individuation occurs after the privation of 
body boundaries. The boundary is defined in its being breached. This phenomenal 
confrontation requires a mediating force, power, space, something to coalesce that 
allows for affect of phenomenal qualities to retroactivity be caused by the real 
object. 
In breve, touch is the penetration of a bounding box that alerts the digital 
object that it has collided with something. The bounding box is hollow and its 
exteriority  is  transparent,  and  the  relation  of  touch  existing  in  the  simulated 
environment transcends the supposed tactile requirements of objectness. All that is 
required is a point, a situatedness to experience touch. The velocity in which an 
object experiences touch is measured according to the depth of the penetration, in 
relation to the centre of its bounding box. Sybren Stüvel et al notes that “collision 
is usually only detected after two objects have some measure of interpenetration, 
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and the penetration depth is then used as a measure of the collision force [5].”  252
Bounding boxes simplify shapes of digital objects, leading one to consider that in 
collision, the contour of an object, its polyhedral mesh, and the volume of the 
bounding box are disparate. “We represent characters by their boundaries and do 
not see them as solids; we consider two objects as colliding when their boundaries 
intersect.  This  means  that  we  will  not  be  able  to  detect  the  case  where  one 
character completely envelops another.”  The measurement of force allows to 253
the calculated response to behave as a physical object would in the causal chain of 
contact being the cause, and displacement its effect. One is entangled with the 
other.
Interestingly,  the  centre  point  of  an  object  has  the  possibility  of  being 
completely absorbed within or entirely co-located with another object. This notion 
of co-location supports the claim for the “dwelling” as a requirement for alterity 
or the radical otherness or differentness from other digital objects.  Dwelling is to 
“live” in a permanent residence as one’s abode.  Lévinas (1961) has stated that 254
“dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself [se tenor] . . . The ‘at home’ is 
not a container but a site.”  This dwelling is a requirement for actions as an “I.” 255
Lévinas however asks, “but how can the same, produced as egoism, enter into 
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relationship with an other without immediately divesting it of its alterity? What is 
the  nature  of  this  relationship?”  This  is  precisely  the  tension  posed  when 256
querying the sensual alterity and the apparatus of touch in the breve environment; 
two objects are others in that they are not assumed by the possession of one or 
another, then, maintain their alterity while participating in a phenomenal relation. 
The site of individuation becomes necessary to maintain alterity. Lévinas contests 
this, stating that alterity is prior to the world we inhabit: “He is not wholly in my 
site.”257
Both collision and the concept of others are based on the assumption that 
digital objects have neighbours. Neighbours are, quite simply, “a person or thing 
in close proximity to another.”  A neighbour is an other. breve has ready-at-hand 258
neighbour  behaviours.  The  process  by  which  to  recognize  others  is  through 
environmental  knowledge;  neighbour  behaviours  are  neighbour  detection, 
crowding  radius  observation,  neighbourhood  size  definition,  and  monitoring. 
These  behaviours  rely  on  location  knowledge  and  communication.  Guillaume 
observes, “it is classic aporia: the aim of communication is the very thing that 
renders it unnecessary. In other words, all communication relies on its opposite 
and on the separation of beings.”  Neighbour behaviours are more complex than 259
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collision handling, and there can be multiple variables by the user programmer 
and  via  the  interactions  of  objects,  controlling  the  interactions  and  responses. 
What is key in these interactions are ways that they relate to each other regardless 
of  observation.  One  can  see  flocking  and  gestural  relations  outside  of  their 
observational framework given that they are products of a few specific calls to 
action from the code. 
One can better understand the practice of neighbour detection through the 
demonstration of Vision Swarm. The demonstration divides the graphic window to 
include a first-person view, illustrating triangular bodies and their bounding box. 
The  main  graphical  window hosts  approximately  sixty  multi-coloured  triangle 
pyramids that signify boids (or “birds”) all engaging in apparently aimless flight. 
There is no goal or energy source to motivate the movement. The floor and blue-
coloured  sky  are  dotted  by  birds  that  follow,  land,  and  take  flight,  following 
commands. 
This  demonstration  illustrates  the  neighbour  detection  required  for 
swarming behaviour.  The relations  of  those  triangular  objects  to  others  in  the 
neighbourhood are clearly marked; the code reads “showNeighborLines.” From 
the code, one can understand in relatively plain language that swarm variables 
alter  the  object  centre,  velocity,  spacing,  max  velocity,  and  max  acceleration. 
Variables are capable of variation, and these variables are exaggerated into three 
classes  of  swarming:  normal,  obediently,  and  wackily.  If  the  variables  are 
changed, then the gestural movements are dramatically different. The gestalt of 
 100
the gesture is desperate and therefore viewed as disjunctive behaviour. “Vectors 
are determined from the state of the world,” and the vectors move away from 
neighbours within a “crowding” radius and move towards the centre of the world 
with the acceleration of an average agent’s velocity.260
 In a similar demonstration, called SwarmEvolve-2.0, the neighbouring and 
swarming  gestures  operate  upon  the  same  logic  as  the  demonstration  Vision 
Swarm.  The tensions between the objects are the same. What is unique in this 
demonstration is that the avoiding crowding radius has an included variable to the 
vector, in order to move away from other species. Species are indicated by the 
colour  of  the  agent  bird.  In  the  previous  demonstration,  the  colour  was  self-
chosen, and here it is the facticity of description. Also added was a goal motivator, 
a  vector  to  move  the  agent  bird  towards  a  randomly  shifting  energy  source, 
indicated in the visualization as a floating, yellow, pentagram-shaped coin. These 
digital agents receive an energy boost when they collide with an energy source. 
They bear energy costs in time step if they collide with another agent, or by being 
in  a  neighbourhood  predominately  composed  of  different  species,  and  when 
giving birth.261
Rich evolutionary behaviour is exhibited in this swarming demonstration, 
and some species outperform others by tracking energy sources. Static clouds of 
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feeders maintain equal distribution amongst the neighbourhood while many feed 
on the energy source. There is a fitness function to these agent birds that allows 
for evolution. The digital agents die and are reborn, receiving a new genotype 
from the “best” agent bird as calculated by energy and age.  As agent birds die 262
when  they  are  not  receiving  an  energy  source,  the  multitude  of  agents  born 
originate  from  those  in  the  pentagonal  coin.  “The  entire  feeding  cloud  can 
therefore  be  thought  of  as  a  genetically  coupled  collective,  or  even  as  a 
multicellular organism in which the peripheral agents act as defensive organs and 
the central agents act as a digestive and reproductive organs.”  Here the analogy 263
of the simulation as body is overt.
VII. A. 3. Internalizing Alterity
The apparatus always produces the subject, producing both an interiority 
and alterity of the digital object. Encapsulation is a means for digital objects to 
possess an interiority that is indicative for their capacity to demonstrate alterity. I 
will  discuss Lévinas’ (1961) notion of  alterity,  incorporated with some insight 
from Jean Baudrillard and Marc Guillaume’s  Radical Alterity (1994) will help 264
me in an effort to motivate an interiority of digital objects. I argue that the object’s 
alterity develops an external and internal divide. Encapsulation then becomes a 
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method  of  individuating  an  object  from  the  domain  and  others—it  is  an 
internalizing project of the apparatus.
Alterity  is  the  relationship  one  experiences  to  otherness.  Otherness  is 
required  for  objects  to  interact  with  one  another  and  in  separation  from their 
digital  environment.  The  notion  of  alterity  is  a  by-product  of  the  agent’s 
separability cut that defines the boundary or the exteriority of the digital body. 
Alterity provides an intentionality, or an interiority, within these digital objects 
whose  interiority  we  normally,  but  mistakenly,  understand  to  be  code.  The 
graphic event is, as simulation theory eludes, incomplete and incomprehensibly 
penetrative. Exteriority is never-ending in the graphical event; however, there is a 
negation of this  exteriority,  and that  occurs through encapsulation.  This object 
otherness occurs when we have established that the representation of the object 
and the environment is indistinguishable, from language/code—like cultures and 
individuals. Alterity, then, is a method of producing the subject, and subsequently, 
alterity describes an interiority.
The  description  of  object-as-other  can  be  understood  via  the  Swarm 
demonstration which indicates opportunities of otherness within the simulation. A 
unique  distinction  in  this  demonstration  is  the  use  of  colour  to  formulate 
groupings amongst the swarming triangles.  I  want to motivate otherness as an 
experience  for  computation  objects  as  necessary  for  the  resemblance  of 
objectivity. It is another phenomenal cut that renders digital objects different from 
their environment.
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The  modularity  of  agents  in  breve  arises  from  encapsulation;  all  data 
required for modifying the agent is internal to the computational object. In Object 
Oriented  Simulations,  Diane  Bischak  and  Stephen  Roberts  identify 265 266
encapsulation  as  a  key  potentiality  of  object-oriented  simulation:  “Objects 
encapsulate  their  functionality  and  that  functional  list  could  include 
‘intelligence’.”  A property within an encapsulated object agent may include a 267
parallel processor that learns and evolves.
I have used Barad’s agential theory and apparatus to cite phenomenal cuts 
as a  product  of  rasterization;  the exteriority developed,  then,  is  an ontological 
exteriority—an exteriority that exists as an object in its own right.  What Lévinas’ 
exteriority develops is the concept of a face. This agential separability of objects 
as in-differentiated from others and their environment is but one way to consider 
these digital objects, be they devices or beings, as individuals or becoming things. 
The  object’s  separability  from the  environment  is  drawn further  into  question 
when  rasterization  occurs.  As  Lévinas  reiterates,  “to  have  meaning  is  to  be 
situated  relative  to  an  absolute,  that  is,  to  come from that  alterity  that  is  not 
absorbed in  its  being perceived.”  Meaning is  a  relation,  and if  phenomenal 268
expression is the quality that is being perceived and is absorbed completely, then 
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there is no objectivity for sensual objects—this I refute. This quote can be spoken 
of to represent the sensual object and sensual quality.
In understanding, the other’s capacity not to be neutralized by possession 
so long as the object is not made property, the alterity of the digital object persists. 
Self-collision is  required for  the  multi-body to  not  completely  possess  or  self 
penetrate.  The  face  of  the  digital  object  is  its  frame  to  its  world.  Sensual 
boundaries  are  considered  as  the  body  is  developed  through  multiple 
configurations. In this demonstration, the apparatus (or the computational method) 
is a linking force that establishes boundaries of unity that allow for an embodied 
performance.
VII. A. 4. Intelligibility of the Multitude 
The  breve  demonstration  titled  creatures  is  an  iteration  of  walking 
behaviours first executed by Karl Sims in Evolved Virtual Creatures (1994). The 
cuboid assemblage of  multiple textural  colours and patterns form a body held 
together  by various  joint  configurations,  as  mentioned previously.  Each multi-
body contains a variety of attributes and can be spoken of colloquially as the 
description of physical objects. The multi-body can be evaluated in terms of joints 
and vectors. 
Creatures begins with a scene in which, after abruptly falling from the sky, 
various  configurations  of  bodies  land  on  their  edges  and  begin  to  move 
autonomously,  and any joining cubes  act  as  limbs.  The ground is  a  repeating 
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texture of light green that alternates in hue, providing the illusion of grass density 
and appearing rigid as it stops the falling blocks of various volumes in place. In 
the background, high brown mountain range circles the simulation environment, 
seemingly  unreachable,  faded  to  almost  transparent  in  the  distance.  This 
demonstration has text on the bottom right-hand side of the screen indicating the 
objects’ generation, previous best distance, and current distance travelled. Each 
body  that  falls  from  the  sky  increases  the  generation  number  by  one.  The 
movement is so jarring that the multi-bodies often fragment and re-join without 
experiencing damage to the joints and the body as a whole. 
Multi-bodies are constructed in breve as a subclass of mobile.  “Mobile 
objects are objects in the simulated world which move around and interact with 
other objects.”  Multi-body is a group of objects connected as a single body that 269
commands a group of objects into one articulate body. A multi-body requires a 
root link object; all links directly and indirectly attached become the multi-body. 
Appearances,  like  other  objects,  are  set  with  texture,  reflection,  and  shadow 
methods. Multi-bodies are unique and require additional collision-handling calls, 
where they can penetrate and collide with themselves. Multi-bodies are articulated 
as one body.
In  the  creatures  demonstration,  digital  objects  interact  as  performative 
agents  constructed  of  multiple  cubes  to  illustrate  the  intelligibility  of  the 
 “The Breve Simulation Environment Documentation | Breve.” 2015. Accessed May 7. http://269
www.spiderland.org/breve/documentation.php.
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multitude. These digital objects operate on the method of multi-body, which have 
groups of objects interacting in a logical whole. An interesting departure from 
Lévinas’ notion of the face, the face here has become spectral, meaning a mode of 
being  and  exchanging  that  is  due  to  multiple  networks  of  communication.  270
Guillaume expresses that “spectrality is the dispersion of the subject.”  Further, 271
Guillaume restates “spectral exchanges with a multitude of others are no direct 
encounters with their alterity . . . they contribute to sculpting the multiple facets of 
the self; they give rise to effects of alteration and alterity within the subject.”  272
The inclusion of a multiplicity of faces in the multi-body’s digital object helps to 
“modernize” Lévinas’ theory that is premised on subject/object relationships and 
extending the notion of response-ability to a variety of others. The intelligibility 
of the multitude is for the world, not a specific observer. 
 Baudrillard and Guillaume, Radical Alterity, 30. 270
 Baudrillard and Guillaume, Radical Alterity, 39. 271
 Baudrillard and Guillaume, Radical Alterity, 40. 272
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VII. Conclusion
This thesis set out to research ways in which contemporary theory has the 
potentiality  to  describe  sensual  objects  in  a  simulated/virtual  environment.  In 
“Representation and Mediating Structure of the Apparatus,” I interrogated how 
representationalism was responsible  for  dissonance in  referent  modelling.  This 
allowed me to  introduce the apparatus as a mediating structure. I proposed that 
fiction  and  metaphor  are  powerful  components  to  simulations  capacity  for 
demonstration.
In this thesis, I put forward the claim that the sensual bodies of digital 
objects has cause little debate in contemporary theory. In an effort to communicate 
digital  objects  autonomy,  I  examine  the  apparatus  as  it  fills  the  role  of  the 
observer,  and as  such instantiates  marks upon the digital  body.  I  establish the 
digital object as a object which ought to be considered in popular object oriented 
ontologies. I backed away from the reflexive perspective of the user, in an attempt 
to differentiate perception from sensation however, this excluded the agency of 
the maker.
For  that  reason,  in  “Applied  Assemblage,”  I  construct  a  definition  of 
sensation that is approximately distant from a representationalist approach. The 
sensible object is defined to be something more than representing a real object. 
Further, I question how the transformation of digital objects in their sensuality are 
made objects ‘appropriate’ for scientific inquiry. Again, I try to advocate for the 
inclusion of digital objects as objects of value. 
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These objects are discussed at length in “Biography of Breve,” where I 
suggest that computational representations embody the theoretical logic of sensual 
exteriority, namely through visualization. I negotiate digital bodies as vertices and 
attributes to be ontologically stable.  I  consider how the linking force of joints 
demonstrate what can be fragmented from an object, is not considered the object 
in itself, rather something countable and other holds. I explore the apparatus as 
always  producing  the  subject—interiority  and  alterity—and  illustrate  how 
encapsulation is the interiority of the computational object. 
As has been stated in “Sensual Facets,” I formulate that rasterization is an 
agency working upon objects,  arguing that it  is  a knowing process that enacts 
meaning through digital  reconfiguration.  The rasterization process  becomes an 
observer that marks (causes) phenomenal expression of exteriority. The cuts that 
occur with the rasterization apparatus provide an unrivalled,  and inexhaustible 
digital exteriority. This exteriority is pronounced by otherness in its condition of 
being a face to a stranger of other digital objects. I exemplify rasterization as the 
apparatus  being  a  boundary-making  practice,  marking  the  digital  body  by 
ascribing properties and meanings by differentiating the digital  object from its 
environment. I defend that digital objects perform an experienced individuation 
from a coalescent environmental body and from other digital bodies.
To advocate for Barad’s infinite universals and as a way to introduce the 
absolute otherness of Levinas theory, the role of ‘domain’ is paramount; the scope 
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of the domain changes drastically the phenomenal cut, as it changes the apparatus 
of measurement.  
In brief, “Sensual Alterity” introduced the architectural landing site as a 
bounding box and as such, it is instrumentally created from the performance of the 
digital body. I defend that the site of individuation becomes necessary to maintain 
alterity. I defend that rigidness is not a quality of substance, rather a boundary that 
is developed through touch, expounding on the idea that alterity is the apparatus 
of otherness. I defend that the face as spectral, and illustrates the intelligibility of 
the multitude.
The  contribution  of  this  work  endeavours  to  define  what  constitutes  a 
sensual alterity between digital objects. The exterior of a digital object is argued 
sensual in the framework provided. I defend a call to action for the metaphysical 
exploration of digital objects and their sensual proprieties.
Moving  forward,  I  am  interested  in  the  relationship  between  sensible 
digital objects and responsibility. Recognizing screen essentialism as a criticism to 
the  limitations  of  the  scope of  my thesis,  I  see  an opportunity  to  explore  the 
materiality of touch gestures not simply considering how the image is entangled 
with its hardware, but what can occur as gestures are interfaced in a simulated 
environment? In what manner does the potential of digital sensuality change the 
way media is constructed or experienced?
I argue that the potentiality of sensual boundaries in digital objects excites 
an empathic transfer of morality in users. What is permissible to code is called 
 110
into question now that intentionality and sensibility are exhibited between digital 
objects. This thesis urges the consideration of the digital object as a stakeholder in 
technological  design,  that  would  include  but  not  be  limited  to  imaging 
technologies, intelligent personal assistants, software, holograms and animation. 
The outcome of this analysis forecasts a future new aesthetics of the object, that 
can be said to participate in the ethical.
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